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Silence is Golden: The New Illinois Rules on
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although most litigation in this country does not attract media
attention, there has always been great concern that too much publicity
might lead to unfairness in the process of adjudicative procedures.'
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; B.A., Princeton University, 1984; J.D.,
University of Puerto Rico Law School, 1987; LL.M., Temple University, 1994. The author
would like to thank Sarah Sallee, April Whitsitt, and Rafael Andrade for their valuable research
assistance.
1. Author Eileen Tanielian, for example, has argued that because of media coverage "[w]hat
was once envisioned to be a guarantee of impartiality for the defendant has evolved into a
guarantee of prejudice... " Eileen F. Tanielian, Battle of the Privileges: First Amendment vs.
Sixth Amendment, 10 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 215, 215 (1990). In Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, the Court stated that the problems presented by excessive media coverage of criminal
trials "are almost as old as the Republic," and concluded that it would be "inconceivable that the
authors of the Constitution were unaware of the potential conflicts between the right to an
unbiased jury and the guarantee of freedom of the press." Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 547 (1976). The Court cited a letter from Thomas Jefferson, written in 1786, where he
concluded that even though it is disturbing that a person could be arraigned in a newspaper, it was
"an evil for which there is no remedy" because "liberty depends on freedom of the press." Id. at
548 (quoting 9 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 239 (J. Boyd ed., 1954)).
In 1807, Aaron Burr complained that it would be difficult to find an impartial jury to serve in
his treason trial because of the publicity surrounding the charges. Id. Since Burr was acquitted,
"there was no occasion for appellate review [of] the problem of prejudicial pretrial publicity."
Id.; see also Robert E. Drechsel, An Alternative View of Media-Judiciary Relations: What the
Non-Legal Evidence Suggests About the Fair Trial-Free Press Issue, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 3
(1989); J. EDWARD GERALD, NEWS OF CRIME: COURTS & PRESS IN CONFLICT 70-72 (1983).
Another famous example appeared in 1935, when almost one thousand reporters and
photographers rallied to a small town in New Jersey to cover the trial of Bruno Hauptmann, who
was accused of the kidnap-murder of Charles Lindbergh's son. Sheldon Portman, The Defense of
Fair Trial from Sheppard to Nebraska Press Association: Benign Neglect to Affirmative Action
and Beyond, 29 STAN. L. REV. 393, 396 (1977). During this trial, the media disrupted the
proceedings by taking pictures and movies in violation of a court order. Id. One newspaper
conducted an informal poll and published that the defendant had been found guilty by the public.
Id. The trial was described as "perhaps the most spectacular and depressing example of improper
publicity and professional misconduct ever presented to the people of the United States in a
criminal trial." Oscar Hallam, Some Object Lessons on Publicity in Criminal Trials, 24 MINN. L.
REV. 453, 454 (1940): see also JOHN D. ZELEZNY, COMMUNICATIONS LAW: LIBERTY,
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Indeed, the notoriety of the parties, the disturbing nature of a crime, the
public interest in the topic of a civil lawsuit or the attempts by attorneys
to use the media to their client's advantage 2 can attract media attention
to a degree that may support the concern that fairness would be
compromised. 3  For example, it has been argued that too much trial
publicity could "threaten to undermine important evidentiary and
procedural protections .... lead to unfair public condemnation of a
targeted party," and lower confidence in the judicial system.4
On the other hand, there is no doubt that openness and availability of
information regarding judicial proceedings of public importance are
fundamental for the preservation of public confidence in the judicial
system and for the protection of the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of expression. 5 Besides, attorneys are often the best spokespersons, and
RESTRAINTS AND THE MODERN MEDIA 244 (1993) (discussing the media frenzy surrounding the
trial). It was in response to this trial that the ABA created the first committee to recommend
ways to deal with the problem of high publicity during trials. Portman, supra, at 397.
2. Many attorneys believe an important skill for an advocate is to know how to work with the
media. Attorney Robert Shapiro, for example, has written several articles on how to manipulate
the press. See Robert Shapiro, Using the Media to Your Advantage, 17 THE CHAMPION 6, Jan.-
Feb. 1993, reprinted in Secrets of a Celebrity Lawyer, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept.-Oct.
1994, at 25; Robert Shapiro, Harnessing the Power of the Press, LEGAL TIMES, June 27, 1994, at
22.
3. For example, a poll conducted by CBS News during the trial of O.J. Simpson concluded
that 87% of the people polled thought the trial was getting too much publicity. CBS News (CBS
television broadcast, July 6, 1994). Similarly, 86% of those polled by the American Bar
Association Journal stated that the coverage had made them more aware of the fact that the media
could affect the defendant's right to a fair trial. Don J. DeBenedictis, The National Verdict,
A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 52, 54.
4. Gabriel Gregg, ABA Rule 3.6 and California Rule 5-120: A Flawed Approach to the
Problem of Trial Publicity, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1321, 1322 (1996).
5. As explained by Professor Nathan Crystal,
[m]edia coverage of pending cases runs the risk that the impartiality of jurors or judges
may be compromised or the testimony of witnesses influenced. Thus, if the integrity of
the adversarial process were the only value involved in determining whether
restrictions on media coverage of pending cases should be allowed, media coverage
would be prohibited until the conclusion of the case. The integrity of the trial process,
however, is not the only value at stake with regard to trial publicity. The risk to the
adversarial process from trial publicity is in tension with constitutional rights of
freedom of the press and free expression.
NATHAN CRYSTAL, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 252 (1998). The
ABA Model Rules also take this approach to the issue. The first paragraph of the comment to
Rule 3.6 reads:
It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and
safeguarding the right of free expression. Preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily
entails some curtailment of the information that may be disseminated about a party
prior to trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved. If there were no such limits,
the result would be the practical nullification of the protective effect of the rules of
forensic decorum and the exclusionary rules of evidence. On the other hand, there are
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speaking to the media is often a "practical necessity" to protect their
clients' rights.
6
The debate over the need to eliminate secrecy and to allow attorneys
to freely talk about their ongoing cases has acquired new strength given
recent developments in products liability litigation over accidents
allegedly caused by defective tires.7 One of the suggestions offered in
the debate over the need to eliminate secrecy in litigation is the adoption
of a new rule of professional conduct prohibiting attorneys from
entering into agreements that would have the effect of preventing useful
information from reaching the public. 8 In part, the proponents of this
new rule would like to see attorneys be free to discuss their cases and
provide information to the media. Nevertheless, the prevailing view is
that a lawyer does not always enjoy the same rights as other citizens to
speak or write about judicial matters. 9
Moreover, when it comes to criminal cases, the prevailing view has
been that the state should exercise control over attorneys' attempts to
reach the media.l° Courts have used different methods to achieve this
control, but one practice common to all states is the development of
rules of professional conduct that specifically address the issue of trial
publicity.11  Although these rules date back to 1887,12 most states have
vital social interests served by the free dissemination of information about events
having legal consequences and about legal proceedings themselves. The public has a
right to know about threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its security. It
also has a legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in
matters of general public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal
proceedings is often of direct significance in debate and deliberation over questions of
public policy.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. para. I (1983) (amended 1999).
6. Ronald Rotunda, Dealing with the Media: Ethical, Constitutional, and Practical
Parameters, 84 ILL. B.J. 614, 614 (1996). As an example, Rotunda discusses the incident in 1993
where attorneys for General Motors conducted a press conference to show the NBC claims of
defects in GM trucks were false. Id. NBC was later forced to admit they had manufactured the
story by altering the trucks. Id.
7. Frances Komoroske, Should You Keep Settlements Secret?, TRIAL, June 1999, at 55;
Richard Zitrin, The Fault Lies in the Ethics Rules, NAT'L L.J., July 9, 2001, at A-25.
8. See Komoroske, supra note 7, at 59.
9. See CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 632 (1986).
10. See infra notes 41-84 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in
favor of state control over attorney access to the press).
11. By 1994, all states except California had adopted one form or another of a professional
conduct rule to regulate trial publicity. Gregg, supra note 4, at 1324. The California State Bar
had explicitly rejected the adoption of such a rule in 1986. Id. However, after the murder trial of
O.J. Simpson, "the California legislature passed a bill ... instructing the California State Bar to
reexamine its position" on trial publicity. Id. A year later the California Supreme Court adopted
a rule substantially identical to ABA Model Rule 3.6. Id.; see also Douglas Mirell, The Latest
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adopted some version of the ABA Models beginning with the ABA
Canons of 1908.13
In 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the trial publicity rule of
the state of Nevada, which was based on an ABA Model Rule, was
unconstitutional as interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court of that
state. 14  In response to this case, the ABA amended its Model Rule on
trial publicity, and several states followed the suggestions of the ABA,
also amending their rules. Following this trend, the Illinois Supreme
Court recently amended two rules of professional conduct. 15 Soon after
these amendments were announced, however, state and federal
prosecutors petitioned the court to reconsider its decision and stay the
effect and enforcement of the new rules. The court denied the petition
and the rules became effective in March, 2000.16 A group of
prosecutors then challenged the constitutionality of the new rules in
federal court, but the court dismissed the complaint without resolving
the constitutional question. 17 The court, however, did suggest that the
rule could be interpreted in a way that would pass constitutional
scrutiny. 18
The rules that limit attorneys' contact with the media were enacted in
an effort to protect both defendants and the state from the effects that
too much publicity could have on a trial, while balancing an attorney's
Threat to Free Speech: California Proposed Bar Rules, COMMUNICATIONS LAWYER, Summer
1995, at 13.
12. In 1887, Alabama promulgated the first official Code of Ethics in the United States.
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1066 (1991) (plurality opinion). It warned attorneys
to avoid newspaper discussion of legal matters. Id. (plurality opinion). It stated that
"[n]ewspaper publications by an attorney as to the merits of pending or anticipated litigation ...
tend to prevent a fair trial in the courts, and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice."
Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting HENRY DRINKER, LEGAL ETHiCs 23, 356 (1953)).
13. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1908).
14. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1048-51 (plurality opinion). Most professional regulation of trial
publicity has been in response to judicial rulings. Professor Ronald Rotunda has stated that "[tihe
history of legal ethics in these areas can be seen as a case where the ABA has steadily loosened
the ethical restraints in response to court rulings holding that various restrictions violated the First
Amendment. The ABA ethics rules have, in effect, been dragged kicking and screaming into the
Twentieth Century." Rotunda, supra note 6, at 615.
15. On October 22, 1999, the Supreme Court of Illinois issued an order amending Rules 3.6
and 3.8 of the Illinois Code of Professional Conduct, effective December 1, 1999. See Complaint
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief app. D, at 2, Devine v. Robinson, 131 F. Supp. 2d 963
(N.D. Il1. 2001) (No. 00-CV-4974) (Petition for Reconsideration and Stay Effect and
Enforcement of Amended Rules of Professional Conduct).
16. Id.
17. Devine, 131 F. Supp. at 963.
18. Id. at 972.
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right to free speech. 19 On the other hand, the rules also have to consider
the right of the press to provide coverage of the judicial system, which
is also constitutionally protected,20 because press coverage is a valuable
component of our democratic form of government.
2 1
19. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. (1999); see supra note 5 (providing the
first paragraph of the comment to Rule 3.6).
20. These rights are protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution, which reads in
part: "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ... 
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948); Pnina Lahav, Holmes and Brandeis: Libertarian and Republican
Justifications for Free Speech, 4 J.L. & POL. 451 (1987) (comparing Justice Holmes'
"marketplace of ideas" justification for free speech with Justice Brandeis' "civic virtue"
justification). There is not much record of the debates concerning the meaning of the First
Amendment in the House and Senate. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANALYSIS & INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. NO. 92-82, at 936 (1973). Indeed, the material available
to determine the intent of the framers is capable of divergent interpretations. Given the ambiguity
of the historical research and the recent interpretations by the Supreme Court, it is now clear that,
notwithstanding the language of the Amendment, its protections are not absolute. Partly for this
reason, the Amendment has generated a vast amount of literature that tries to develop a theory of
its basis and meaning.
Alexander Meiklejohn has been the most commonly cited proponent of the model that
interprets the First Amendment as a method of protecting and encouraging self-government by
the public. See also Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 544 (differentiating the checking value with individual autonomy); Martin
Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy and Freedom of Expression: A Reply to Professor Baker,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 678 (1982) (arguing that free speech enhances the individual's contribution to
the social welfare and, thus, to his self-fulfillment); Martin Redish, The Value of Free Speech,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982) (positing that the constitutional guarantee of free speech aids
in the individual's development of autonomy and human development).
Another influential approach to the First Amendment has been the "marketplace of ideas"
model. According to this model, the function of the First Amendment is to guarantee the
competition of ideas. This model has been traced back to John Milton. See JOHN MILTON,
AREOPAGITICA (AMS Press 1971). The notion of the competition of ideas was later developed
by John Stuart Mill. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 2 (Hackett Publishing Co. 1978)
(1859). In Abrams v. United States Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes adopted this model and used
it to argue his dissenting opinion. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919); see
generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE
ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT 2-14 (1994); Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl, Freedom of the Press and
the Business of Journalism: The Myth of the Democratic Competition in the Marketplace of
Ideas, 67 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 447, 452 (1998).
A third model values the protection of free speech as a contribution to the fulfillment of an
individual's personal liberty. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech,
25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 966 (1991). Yet, the First Amendment is perhaps better understood as a
combination of all of these ideas. See, e.g., THOMAS EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (1963) (arguing that the First Amendment protection of free speech
is necessary (1) as a way to assure individual self-fulfillment, (2) as a means to attain the truth,
(3) as a method of securing participation by the members of society in social and political
decision-making, and (4) as a method to keep the balance between stability and change in
society). In his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, Justice Brandeis advocated freedom
of speech as "indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth" and as essential to a
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The First Amendment's protection of speech serves to fulfill the
values of freedom of expression, participation in democratic
government, and self-realization. 22  Yet, proponents of rules that limit
attorneys' freedom of speech argue that those types of rules provide a
balance between the freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and
the right to fair trials by regulating "to ensure fairness in adjudicative
proceedings." 23  Opponents reply that these types of rules create a
chilling effect and may suppress speech of particular social importance,
particularly in cases where the defendant is claiming governmental
misconduct.24 Also, a defendant's lawyer is often his or her only
spokesperson and the attorney's ability to speak out on behalf of the
client is part of his or her professional duty.25  In cases like these,
denying the attorney the chance to access the media may result in
substantial injustice for the client. 26
Given the different roles that prosecutors play in the criminal justice
system, some commentators have argued that the rules that limit
extrajudicial speech should apply only to prosecutors, because
stable government and to political change. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
22. "Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs." Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829,
838 (1978) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). "[Sipeech concerning public
affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). The Framers "gave into our keeping the value of preserving free
expression and, in particular, the preservation of political expression, which is commonly
conceded to be the value at the core of [the First Amendment]." Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970,
996 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the function of the press in our society. As early
as the 1930s the Court explained:
The newspapers, magazines and other journals of the country ... have shed and
continue to shed, more light on the public and business affairs of the nation than any
other instrumentality of publicity; and since informed public opinion is the most potent
of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of the publicity
afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern.
Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936); see also Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359, 369 (1931) (reversing the defendant's criminal conviction based on a vague statute which
could be interpreted to restrict his right to participate in political discussion).
23. Lance Northcutt, New Supreme Court Rules on Extrajudicial Statements, CBA REC., Feb.-
Mar. 2001, at 55, 58 (citing Mary Robinson, administrator of the Illinois Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Commission).
24. Id.; Gregg, supra note 4, at 1323.
25. Rotunda, supra note 6, at 614.
26. Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 250 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub
nom. Cunningham v. Chi. Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
Silence is Golden
the defense requires access to pretrial publicity in order to counter
adverse non-lawyer publicity about the accused, that is fomented by
actions and statements of the police at the time of the report of the
crime and the arrest of the accused and because the fair trial right
implicated by the anti-comment rules should be waivable by the
accused.27
Typically, it is assumed that information unfavorable to the defendant is
provided to the press by the police or government agents investigating
the crime, with or without the participation of the prosecution. Thus, it
is argued, defense attorneys should be allowed access to the press in
order to level the playing field.
This Article will discuss the debate over rules of professional conduct
that seek to limit attorneys' rights to make extrajudicial statements and
the rules recently approved by the Illinois Supreme Court. 28 It will also
discuss the arguments presented by Illinois prosecutors as part of their
attack on the validity of the new rules.29 Finally, the Article will offer
some suggestions to clarify certain drafting problems in the rules and
suggest how courts should interpret and apply the rules in the future.
30
II. REGULATION OF SPEECH BY ATIORNEYS AND TRIAL PUBLICITY
There is no doubt that prejudicial publicity can threaten a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by creating the possibility that the
jury may reach a decision not based on the information provided at trial
but on the publicity itself. Prejudicial publicity can also taint the
reputation of trial participants who do not have the opportunity to
respond to it. The Sixth Amendment's right to a fair trial is recognized
as one of the "most fundamental of all freedoms," 3 1 essential "to the
preservation and enjoyment of all other rights." 32  It includes the
27. Richard Hirst, Silence Orders-Preserving Political Expression by Defendants and Their
Lawyers, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 595, 604, 606-08 (1976), cited in Charles Wolfram, supra
note 9, at 635 n.5; see also Monroe Freedman & Janet Starwood, Prior Restraints on Freedom of
Expression by Defendants and Defense Attorneys, 29 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1977).
28. See infra Part IIl.
29. See infra Part IV.A.
30. See infra Part IV.B.
31. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965). Chief Justice Rehnquist has stated: "Few, if
any, interests under the Constitution are more fundamental than the right to a fair trial by
'impartial' jurors, and an outcome affected by extrajudicial statements would violate that
fundamental right." Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting as to Part III).
32. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 586 (1976) (Brennan, J., with Stewart and
Marshall, JJ., concurring in judgment). Note also that the state also has a right to a fair trial and
in maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the judicial system. Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 559, 565 (1965).
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defendant's right to have his or her guilt determined solely on the basis
of the evidence introduced at trial,33 to have a speedy and public trial by
an impartial jury, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, to confront the state's witnesses, and to have effective
assistance of counsel.34 Trial courts have a duty to protect these
rights. 35
The first attempt to control trial publicity through the use of
professional standards occurred in 1887 when Alabama issued its first
Ironically, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the best way to promote confidence in
the system is by guaranteeing the openness of the proceedings because the guarantee of a public
trial was created for the benefit of the defendant. In In re Oliver, for example, the Court held that
a secret contempt trial violated the defendant's right to a public trial under the Fourteenth
Amendment. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 272-73 (1948). The Court stated:
[The right to a public trial] has always been recognized as a safeguard against any
attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution. The knowledge that every
criminal trial is subject to contempt review in the forum of public opinion is an
effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.
Id. at 270. In Estes v. Texas, the Court again recognized that the purpose of the requirement of a
public trial exists to guarantee a fair trial for the accused. Estes, 381 U.S. at 538.
In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, Chief Justice Burger announced the judgment of the
Court and wrote an opinion, joined by Justices White and Stevens, asserting that criminal trials
are presumptively open to the public and the media, in part because the openness itself acts as an
assurance of fairness for all concerned. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570,
573 (1980). In a separate concurring opinion, Justices Brennan and Marshall agreed and
declared: "Publicity serves to advance several of the particular purposes of the trial (and, indeed,
the judicial) process. Open trials play a fundamental role in furthering the efforts of our judicial
system to assure the criminal defendant a fair and accurate adjudication of guilt or innocence."
Id. at 593 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435
U.S. 829, 838-39 (1999) (noting that the judicial system plays a vital role in society and the
public has a legitimate interest in its operations); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (II), 478 U.S.
1, 7 (1986) ("The right to an open public trial is a shared fight of the accused and the public, the
common concern being the assurance of fairness."); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S.
501, 508 (1984) ("Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the
appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system.").
33. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567 (1986) (citing Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478,
485 (1978)). "The goal of the limits on lawyer conduct are to assure that the premises of the
adversary process are satisfied-that the fact finder ultimately has an opportunity to decide the
case based solely on the evidence that is admitted at trial." Kevin Cole & Fred Zacharias, The
Agony of Victory and the Ethics of Lawyer Speech, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1627, 1649 (1996). In his
opinion in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to "the theory upon
which our criminal justice system is founded" and described it as follows: "The outcome of a
criminal trial is to be decided by impartial jurors, who know as little as possible of the case, based
on material admitted into evidence before them in a court proceeding." Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1070
(plurality opinion).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
35. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335 (1966) (holding that courts have to take an
affirmative role in protecting the rights of defendants from undue interference by the press).
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official code of ethics. 36  The Alabama Code warned lawyers against
making extrajudicial statements concerning the merits of a case because
such comments might prejudice the proceedings. 37 The most influential
professional standards, however, were the ABA Canons of Professional
Ethics, adopted in 1908.38 Canon 20 reflected a very negative view of
trial publicity. Although purely an aspiration and not enforced through
the disciplinary process, 39 Canon 20 "generally condemned" any
attempt to seek publicity for a pending or anticipated case and stated
that, even in extreme circumstances, statements to the press by attorneys
should be avoided. 40
While most states adopted some version of the ABA Canons, most of
the attention regarding pre-trial publicity revolved around the media and
not the lawyers. Between 1959 and 1966, the Supreme Court, for the
first time, reversed several criminal convictions because they had been
reached under circumstances heavily influenced by media coverage.41
In Marshall v. United States, for example, the Court reversed a
conviction because seven of the twelve jurors were exposed to news
accounts of evidence that was not admitted at trial.42 The Court
36. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1066 (plurality opinion) (quoting HENRY DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS
356 (1953)).
37. Id. The Alabama rule stated "newspaper publications by an attorney as to the merits of
pending or anticipated litigation ... tend to prevent a fair trial in the courts, and otherwise
prejudice the due administration of justice." Id.
38. The ABA Canons were actually based, in part, on the Alabama Code. The Canons were
taken seriously by the courts as sources of law, but they were not generally adopted by
jurisdictions or state bar associations. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE
LAW OF LAWYERING § 1.10 (3d ed. 2001).
39. Lawrence Hellman, The Oklahoma Supreme Court's New Rules on Attorneys' Trial
Publicity: Realism and Aspiration, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 20 (1998); see also Catherine Cupp
Thiesen, The New Model Rule 3.6: An Old Pair of Shoes, 44 KAN. L. REV. 837 (1996) (stating
that the principal concern of the canons was not fair trials but professionalism among attorneys or
"how to practice law like gentlemen").
40. Canon 20 states in full:
Newspaper publications by lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may interfere
with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice.
Generally they are to be condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a particular case
justify a statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously. An ex
parte reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation from the records and papers
on file in the court; but even in extreme cases, it is better to avoid any ex parte
statement.
ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS, CANON 20: NEWSPAPER DISCUSSION OF PENDING LITIGATION
(2001).
41. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965);
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Marshall v.
United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) (reversing a conviction because of the effects of trial publicity
for the first time).
42. Marshall, 360 U.S. at 312-13.
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concluded that "prejudice to the defendant is almost certain to be as
great when that evidence reaches the jury through news accounts as
when it is a part of the prosecution's evidence."
43
Two years later, in Irvin v. Dowd,44 the Court again reversed a
murder conviction because of the pervasiveness of the pre-trial
publicity. In this case, the defendant was accused of murder in a small
rural community. 45 Between the time of the arrest and the time of the
trial, ninety-five percent of the homes in the trial court's county had
access to numerous newspaper articles and editorials against the
defendant. 46 The press reported that the defendant had confessed to the
six murders and described him as "remorseless and without
conscience." 47  In addition, the press commented on his juvenile
criminal convictions and published a story about his court-martial
during the war. 48 Ninety percent of the jurors questioned in voir dire
had formed an opinion as to the defendant's guilt.49 Eight of the twelve
actual jurors had stated in voir dire that they thought the defendant was
guilty.50 Given these facts, although the jurors indicated that they could
render an impartial verdict, the Court found a "pattern of deep and bitter
prejudice" created by extensive media coverage and reversed the lower
court.
5 1
Similarly, in Rideau v. Louisiana, the Court reversed the defendant's
conviction because the trial court denied a change of venue after a
television station aired a filmed confession three times, reaching a
combined audience estimated at 106,000 viewers in a community of
approximately 150,000 people.52 The Court held that the refusal of the
request for a change of venue was a denial of due process because the
televised confession "in a very real sense was Rideau's trial, 53 and that
"[a]ny subsequent court proceedings in a community so pervasively
exposed to such a spectacle could be but a hollow formality." 54 Finally,
43. Id.
44. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 717.
45. The community had approximately 30,000 inhabitants. Id. at 719.
46. Id. at 725.
47. Id. at 726.
48. Id. at 725.
49. Id. at 727.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 727, 729.
52. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 724 (1963). The viewers each time the segment was
aired was estimated at 24,000, 53,000, and 29,000 respectively. The 106,000 total in the text
does not account for the possibility of repeat viewers.
53. Id. at 726.
54. Id.
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in 1965, the Supreme Court reversed yet another conviction because of
the effect of pretrial publicity. In Estes v. Texas, the Court held that the
defendant had been deprived of due process of law after a pretrial
hearing was televised live and later rebroadcast to approximately
100,000 viewers. 55 In addition, the court proceedings were disrupted by
the presence of reporters, photographers, cameramen and their
equipment. 5
6
Through this line of decisions, the Supreme Court reacted to the
particular circumstances of each case and attempted to provide a remedy
for them. However, the Court did not explain or give guidance to trial
courts on how to solve the future issues related to prejudicial publicity.
The debate about freedom of the press and fair trials, however,
continued to receive increased national attention in 1963, after the
Report of the Warren Commission on the Assassination of President
Kennedy ("the Warren Report") criticized the news media for its role in
creating the publicity surrounding the allegations against Lee Harvey
Oswald.57 In fact, the Warren Commission expressed doubts that
Oswald could ever have received a fair trial58 and concluded: "The
courtroom, not the newspaper or television screen, is the appropriate
forum in our system for the trial of a man accused of a crime." 59
Among other things, the Warren Report specifically recommended
the creation of ethical standards regarding trial publicity to avoid
interference with criminal investigations and the rights of defendants. 60
In response to this recommendation and the decisions of the Supreme
55. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 550-52 (1965).
56. Id. at 551.
57. The report mentioned incriminating, but inadmissible, evidence published by the press
which could have affected the fairness of the trial, such as alleged statements made by Oswald's
wife and Oswald's refusal to take a lie detector test. THE WARREN COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY 238 (1964). The
report concluded that the "[public's] curiosity should not have been satisfied at the expense of the
accused's right to a trial by an impartial jury." Id. at 240.
58. Id. at 239 ("The Commission agrees that Lee Harvey Oswald's opportunity for a trial by
12 jurors free of preconception ... would have been seriously jeopardized by the premature
disclosure and weighing of the evidence against him.").
59. Id. at 240.
60. Id. at 27. In his opinion in Gentile, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited a recommendation in the
Warren Commission Report that reads: "[R]epresentatives of the bar, law enforcement
associations, and the news media [should] work together to establish ethical standards concerning
the collection and presentation of information to the public so that there will be no interference
with pending criminal investigations, court proceedings, or the right of individuals to a fair trial."
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1067 (1991) (plurality opinion) (citing Robert A.
Ainsworth, An Address Before the Eight Circuit Judicial Conference on the Subject of Fair Trial-
Free Press (1968), reprinted in Fair Trial-Free Press 45 F.R.D. 417 (1991)).
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Court, the Judicial Conference of the United States conducted a study
and suggested three areas of concern for trial courts: release of
information to the press by attorneys, release of information by other
trial participants, and the regulation of trial proceedings to protect jurors
from prejudicial influences. 61  Likewise, the ABA appointed a
committee to develop standards to regulate the criminal justice
system.
62
While the work of the ABA committee was ongoing, the Supreme
Court provided guidelines on how to balance the interests of the press
and the rights of a criminal defendant in Sheppard v. Maxwell.63  In
Sheppard, the Court reversed a conviction for murder, holding that the
publicity surrounding the trial had deprived the defendant of his right to
a fair trial.64 Even before the defendant was arrested, the media
published countless stories about him, which accentuated his alleged
failure to cooperate with the investigation and called strongly for his
arrest.65  Many articles and editorials insinuated that Sheppard was
guilty and discussed incriminating evidence that was never introduced
at trial.6 6 During the trial itself, the constant movement of reporters in
the courtroom made it difficult for witnesses to be heard.6 7
61. Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair
Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391, 401 (1968). Interestingly, the committee did not recommend any
direct curb or restraint on publication by the press. Id. at 401-02.
62. The recommendations of this committee (usually referred to as the Reardon Committee
because it was chaired by Justice Paul Reardon of the Massachusetts Supreme Court) were
published as ABA Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press (1968). The
recommendations were later adopted by the ABA as part of its ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice. These recommendations were based on the conclusion that too much publicity about a
trial can have a prejudicial effect on the fairness of the process. The report has been criticized,
however, because it did not support this finding with any evidence from experiments, available at
the time, about the effect of publicity on jurors, nor did the committee attempt to conduct its own
experiments. It based its conclusions on the results of a questionnaire sent to attorneys and
judges. See Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom and
Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REV. 431, 446-47 (1977).
63. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
64. Id. at 363.
65. Id. at 338-39. After an article demanded to know why there had been no public inquest, a
three day inquest took place, and Sheppard's questioning was covered on both television and
radio. Id. at 339. Apparently another article influenced the decision to arrest Sheppard, since he
was arrested hours after the headline "Why Isn't Sam Sheppard in Jail?" was published. See id. at
341.
66. Id. at 340-41.
67. Id. at 344. Twenty people were assigned to a special table for media representatives in the
courtroom. Id. at 343. The court also reserved four rows of seats behind the bar railing for
television and radio reporters and for representatives of out-of-town newspapers and magazines.
Id. The media used all available rooms in the building and a radio station was allowed to
broadcast from a room adjacent to the room where the jury rested and deliberated. Id.
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Furthermore, because of the defendant's proximity to reporters in the
courtroom, it was almost impossible for him to speak privately with his
attorney during the proceedings. 68 Despite these circumstances, the trial
judge did not take steps to limit the effects of the publicity or the
behavior of the press during the trial. The judge did not grant a
continuance, change the venue of the trial, sequester the jury, insulate
the jurors from reporters, or prevent reporters from disrupting the
proceedings. 69
In criticizing the trial court for allowing a "carnival atmosphere" 70 in
the courtroom and for failing to control the flow of publicity, the
Supreme Court ordered lower courts to take an affirmative role in
protecting the rights of defendants from undue interference by the press:
From the cases coming here we note that unfair and prejudicial news
comment on pending trials has become increasingly prevalent. Due
process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury
free from outside influences. Given the pervasiveness of modern
communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity
from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures
to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused.71
The line of decisions that began with Marshall and culminated in
Sheppard thus sent a clear message to trial courts that even in the
absence of actual prejudice, pervasive pretrial publicity can affect a
defendant's right to a fair trial and that courts have a duty to protect the
defendant from the effects of prejudicial publicity. In Sheppard, the
Court enumerated some ways in which courts could make sure that
publicity does not affect the defendant's right to a fair trial.72 For
example, courts could regulate the conduct of reporters in the
courtroom,73 order a change of venue,74 order a continuance of the
trial,75 isolate the witnesses,76 and control the release of information to
the media by law enforcement personnel and counsel.77 However, the
68. Id. at 344.
69. Id. at 354 n.9, 358-59.
70. Id. at 358.
71. Id. at 362.
72. Id. at 363.
73. Id. at 358.
74. Id. at 363.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 359.
77. Id. at 360-61. The Supreme Court has implied that a restraint on trial participants, which
prevents information from reaching the media, is not the equivalent of a prior restraint on the
media, which is presumed to be unconstitutional. See Mark R. Stabile, Note & Comment, Free
Press-Fair Trial: Can They Be Reconciled in a Highly Publicized Criminal Case?, 79 GEO. L.J.
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Court emphasized that the remedy for prejudicial publicity is the
implementation of measures to prevent prejudice at its inception, 78
including the creation of professional disciplinary measures. 79
Given the clear mandate by the Supreme Court to lower courts, the
committee appointed by the ABA to develop standards to regulate the
criminal justice system adopted a new approach toward trial publicity
rules. In contrast with the purely aspirational approach of the 1908
Canons, the committee sought ways to implement the Supreme Court's
suggestions. The committee worked for four years and presented a draft
to the ABA House of Delegates in 1968.80 The standards contained a
337, 342-43 (1990) (arguing for a consistent standard for imposing gag orders); Ren6 L. Todd,
Note, A Prior Restraint by Any Other Name: The Judicial Response to Media Challenges of Gag
Orders Directed at Trial Participants, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1171, 1181-87 (1990) (arguing that
there should be no distinction between prior restraints on the press and gag orders on trial
participants).
78. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363. The effectiveness of these remedial measures has been
questioned, however. See, e.g., Robert P. Isaacson, Fair Trial and Free Press: An Opportunity
for Coexistence, 29 STAN. L. REV. 561, 561-74 (1977).
79. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363. The Court stated:
The cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception.
The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes
from prejudicial outside interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for the defense,
the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the
jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function. Collaboration
between counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial
is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary
measures.
Id.
80. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1978). Ten standards were approved in 1968,
three in 1970, two in 1971, one in 1972, and the rest in 1973. 1 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE at xx, xxii (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
The introduction to the second edition of the standards explains that they are intended to be a
balanced attempt "to walk the fine line between the protection of society and the protection of
constitutional rights of the accused individual." I id. at xix (quoting Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger in his 1974 introduction to the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice). The standards are not
model codes nor rules for jurisdictions.
[T]hey are guidelines and recommendations intended to help criminal justice planners
design a system, set goals and priorities to achieve it, and propose procedures for
adoption by the legislature, courts, and practitioners to operate and keep it viable-all
targeted toward achieving a criminal justice system that is fair, balanced, and
constitutionally responsive to the needs of today and the future.
1 id. at xx. Jurisdictions are free to adopt the standards and choose to implement them in various
ways, such as translating them into a code, rules of court or practice, or by encouraging judicial
officers to look to the standards as authority in deciding appropriate cases. I id. at xix.
These standards, however, are not the first attempt by the ABA to solve the problems created
by high publicity during trials. In 1936, in response to incidents during the trial of Bruno
Hauptmann, the ABA formed a special committee to study the effects of publicity on trials. The
committee eventually proposed sixteen recommendations, most of which were directed at limiting
the amount of information given by trial participants. Portman, supra note 1, at 397; see also
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chapter on the issue of "fair trial and free press," which included
sections on the conduct of attorneys and judges during trials. 81 Most of
these standards were based on the remedial recommendations of the
Supreme Court in Sheppard.82 For example, the ABA recommended
that in order to minimize the effect of publicity on the jurors that the
public be excluded from pretrial hearings, 83 hearings that are outside the
presence of the jury, continuances, changes of venue, control of the trial
participants, and from the use of voir dire.84  As to the conduct of
attorneys in relation to trial publicity, Standard 1-1 provided:
It is the duty of the lawyer not to release or authorize the release of
information or opinion for dissemination by any means of public
communication in connection with pending or imminent criminal
litigation with which he is associated, if there is a reasonable
likelihood that such dissemination will interfere with a fair trial or
otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice.85
Following this lead, the ABA adopted a rule on the subject which it
included in the new Model Code of Professional Responsibility of 1969.
Moreover, in contrast with the old Canons, and as suggested by the
Court in Sheppard, the rule on trial publicity was included as one of the
"disciplinary rules," the violation of which could be enforced through
the disciplinary process. 86 The section was also a much more detailed
attempt to regulate attorneys' conduct as to trial publicity.87 For
supra note I (discussing the trial of Bruno Hauptmann). However, the committee did not make
any recommendations regarding pretrial publicity generated by police or non-attorney law
enforcement officers. Portman, supra note 1, at 398. The committee also failed to emphasize the
duty and powers of the trial courts to protect the rights of defendants. Id.
81. See generally 2 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 80, §§ 8.1-8.61 (1st ed. & Supp. 1 1982 &
Supp. 11 1986).
82. 2 Id. at §§ 8.4-8.5.
83. This exclusion would now be declared unconstitutional. In Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court (H), theSupreme Court decided that there is a qualified First Amendment right of
access to pretrial proceedings. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (II), 478 U.S. 1, 2 (1986).
84. 1 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 80, at 37-47.
85. ABA Advisory Comm. on Fair Trial and Free Press, Standards Relating to Fair Trial And
Free Press, Standard 1-1 (1968), cited in Esther Berkowitz-Caballero, In the Aftermath of Gentile:
Reconsidering the Efficacy of Trial Publicity Rules, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 494, 508 (1993); Gregg,
supra note 4, at 1334.
86. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1969) (amended 1981).
87. Id. The provision appeared in Disciplinary Rule 7-107, which states:
(A) A lawyer participating in or associated with the investigation of a criminal matter
shall not make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable
person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication and that
does more than state without elaboration:
(1) Information contained in a public record.
(2) That the investigation is in progress.
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(3) The general scope of the investigation including a description of the offense
and, if permitted by law, the identity of the victim.
(4) A request for assistance in apprehending a suspect or assistance in other
matters and the information necessary thereto.
(5) A warning to the public of any dangers.
(B) A lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a criminal
matter shall not, from the time of the filing of a complaint, information, or indictment,
the issuance of an arrest warrant, or arrest until the commencement of the trial or
disposition without trial, make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a
reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication
and that relates to:
(1) The character, reputation, or prior criminal record (including arrests,
indictments, or other charges of crime) of the accused.
(2) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or to a lesser offense.
(3) The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by
the accused or his refusal or failure to make a statement.
(4) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or
failure of the accused to submit to examinations or tests.
(5) The identity, testimony, or credibility of a prospective witness.
(6) Any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the evidence, or the
merits of the case.
(C) DR 7-107 (B) does not preclude a lawyer during such period from announcing:
(1) The name, age, residence, occupation, and family status of the accused.
(2) If the accused has not been apprehended, any information necessary to aid in
his apprehension or to warn the public of any dangers he may present.
(3) A request for assistance in obtaining evidence.
(4) The identity of the victim of the crime.
(5) This fact, time, and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use of weapons.
(6) The identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length
of the investigation.
(7) At the time of seizure, a description of the physical evidence seized, other
than a confession, admission, or statement.
(8) The nature, substance, or text of the charge.
(9) Quotations from or references to public records of the court in the case.
(10) The scheduling or result of any step in the judicial proceedings.
(11) That the accused denies the charges made against him.
(D) During the selection of a jury or the trial of a criminal matter, a lawyer or law firm
associated with the prosecution or defense of a criminal matter shall not make or
participate in making an extra-judicial statement that a reasonable person would expect
to be disseminated by means of public communication and that relates to the trial,
parties, or issues in the trial or other matters that are reasonably likely to interfere with
a fair trial, except that he may quote from or refer without comment to public records
of the court in the case.
(E) After the completion of a trial or disposition without trial of a criminal matter and
prior to the imposition of sentence, a lawyer or law firm associated with the
prosecution or defense shall not make or participate in making an extra-judicial
statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by public
communication and that is reasonably likely to affect the imposition of sentence.
(F) The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 also apply to professional disciplinary
proceeding and juvenile disciplinary proceedings when pertinent and consistent with
other law applicable to such proceedings.
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example, it establishes separate guidelines for civil cases, criminal
cases, professional disciplinary proceedings, juvenile hearings, and
administrative proceedings. For all of these types of cases, the rule
essentially states that attorneys could be sanctioned for making
comments about pending or imminent litigation if there is a "reasonable
likelihood" that the comments would interfere with a fair trial or
otherwise prejudice the administration of justice. 88  According to the
rule, during the investigation and up to jury selection in a criminal trial,
a lawyer can only make very limited factual statements.89 Thus,
beginning with jury selection in a criminal trial and in all stages of
juvenile proceedings, civil trials, disciplinary proceedings, and
administrative proceedings, a lawyer is banned from making any
(G) A lawyer or law firm associated with a civil action shall not during its
investigation or litigation make or participate in making an extra-judicial statement,
other than a quotation from or reference to public records, that a reasonable person
would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication and that relates to:
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness, or
prospective witness.
(3) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or
failure of a party to submit to such.
(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims or defenses of a party, except as
required by law or administrative rule.
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial of the action.
(H) During the pendency of an administrative proceeding, a lawyer or law firm
associated therewith shall not make or participate in making a statement, other than a
quotation from or reference to public records, that a reasonable person would expect to
be disseminated by means of public communication if it is made outside the official
course of the proceeding and relates to:
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party witness, or
prospective witness.
(3) Physical evidence or the performance or results of any examinations or tests
or the refusal or failure of a party to submit to such.
(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims, defenses, or positions of an
interested person.
(5) Any other matter reasonable likely to interfere with a fair hearing.
(I) The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 do not preclude a lawyer from replying to
charges of misconduct publicly made against him or from participating in the
proceedings of legislative, administrative, or other investigative bodies.
(J) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees and associates
from making an extra-judicial statement that he would be prohibited from making
under DR 7-107.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1969) (amended 1981).
88. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107(A)-(B), (C)-(H), (J) (1969)
(amended 1981).
89. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107(A)-(B) (1969) (amended 1981).
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comment that is "reasonably likely to interfere with a fair"
proceeding. 90
This last portion of the rule was based on the "reasonable likelihood"
standard mentioned by the Supreme Court in Sheppard.91 Interestingly,
in Sheppard, the Court used this standard to refer to circumstances in
which lower courts should consider alternative methods to control their
courtrooms. The Model Code, however, uses the same language as the
basis for the discipline of certain speech.92 The Code, thus, was
suggesting that the state could punish attorneys for their speech based
on a "reasonable likelihood" standard. This invited a constitutional
challenge of the Model Code's approach.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE APPROACH OF THE ABA CODE
Although the ABA Code served as the model for rules adopted by all
states, the section on trial publicity was not well received by the courts.
"Practically every court that considered constitutional challenges" to the
Code's section on trial publicity ruled that it was overbroad.93 For
example, in Hirschkop v. Snead94 the Fourth Circuit found the Code's
reasonable likelihood standard valid in the context of criminal jury trials
but unconstitutional as applied to civil and administrative proceedings. 95
The court also found that even in the criminal trial context, the
provision banning "any statements about 'other matters that are likely to
interfere with a fair trial"' was so vague that it created a trap for the
unwary. 96  Likewise, in In re Keller97 the Montana Supreme Court
dismissed charges against the attorneys and found some sections of the
Code's provisions to be unconstitutional.98 The court concluded that
90. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107(D) (1969) (amended 1981).
91. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
92. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107(D) (1969) (amended 1981).
93. 1 GEOFFREY HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 665 (2d ed. Supp. 1994), cited
in Hellman, supra note 39, at 20; see Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied sub nom. Cunningham v. Chi. Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976);
Markfield v. Ass'n of the Bar of New York, 370 N.Y.S.2d 82, 85 (App. Div. 1975), appeal
dismissed, 337 N.E.2d 612 (1975) (holding that disciplinary rules should be applied only when
there is a clear and present danger that extrajudicial remarks will interfere with fair administration
of justice).
94. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979).
95. Id. at 374.
96. Id. at 371.
97. In re Keller, 693 P.2d 1211 (Mont. 1984).
98. Id. at 1214.
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the provisions abridged free speech rights without creating a clear
standard by which attorneys could gauge their conduct.
99
The most influential decision on the subject was issued by the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
Bauer.1°° In Bauer, the plaintiffs challenged Rule 1.07 of the Local
Criminal Rules for the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, which was nearly identical to Standard 1-1 and very similar to
the ABA Code's DR 7-107's provision for criminal cases. 10 1 The
District Court dismissed the challenge, but the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals found the rules to be "constitutionally infirm" because they did
not incorporate a "serious and imminent threat standard."' 1 2 The court
held that only statements that posed a "serious and imminent threat" of
interference with the administration of justice could be subject to state
regulation.10 3 Thus, the rule violated the First Amendment because the
standard used to restrict speech was vague and overbroad.'1°4 The court
also concluded that the provisions of the rule could result in sanctions
for even a trivial, totally innocuous statement, which would not be
consistent with the First Amendment. 1
05
In response to Bauer, the ABA again set out to revise its approach in
the Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice and
adopted a new Standard 8-1..106 Eventually, the ABA changed the
"reasonable likelihood" language to a "clear and present danger"
standard, which was more traditionally associated with restrictions on
speech. 10 7 However, despite the fact that the court's reasoning in Bauer
99. Id.
100. Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom.
Cunningham v. Chi. Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
101. Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 371 F. Supp. 689, 690, 692 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1974), rev'd,
522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975); see also supra note 85 and accompanying text (stating Standard I-
1).
102. Chi. Council of Lawyers, 522 F.2d at 251.
103. Id. at 249. The court also held that comments made during the period between
completion of the trial and sentencing, by definition, could not be deemed to pose a serious and
imminent threat and, therefore, the Code's regulation of comments "reasonably likely to affect the
imposition of sentence" was invalid. Id. at 257.
104. Id. at 251. In fact, the court said, "[w]e do not believe that there can be a blanket
prohibition on certain areas of comment ... without any consideration of whether the particular
statement posed a serious and imminent threat of interference with a fair trial." Id.
105. Id.
106. 1 ABA STANDARDS 2D, supra note 80, at § 8-1.1.
107. It is traditionally assumed that the "clear and present danger" formulation was created by
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his opinion in Schenck v. United States, where he wrote:
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting
fire in a theater .... The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
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also supported a constitutional challenge to section DR 7-107 of the
Code, the ABA left it unchanged.
A. The Approach of the ABA Model Rules
Just seven years after the Model Code was approved, the ABA
created a commission to revise it. Eventually, in 1983, the ABA House
of Delegates adopted a new code called the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. This new collection of regulations does not follow the format
of the Model Code. In the ABA Model Rules the material is divided
into "rules" and "comments." The "rules" explain the duties of
attorneys in different contexts. Each rule is followed by a "comment,"
which explains the meaning of the rule and sometimes provides
examples for its application. When preparing the Model Rules, the
drafters included a new rule to regulate attorneys' conduct in relation to
pre-trial publicity. 10 8 The first paragraph of the comment to the rule
explains the ABA's concern for the integrity of the trial process on one
hand and the value of free expression on the other:
It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair
trial and safeguarding the right to free expression. Preserving the right
to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the information
that may be disseminated about a party prior to trial, particularly
where trial by jury is involved. If there were no such limits, the result
would be the practical nullification of the protective effect of the rules
of forensic decorum and the exclusionary rules of evidence. On the
other hand, there are vital social interests served by the free
dissemination of information about events having legal consequences
and about legal proceedings themselves. The public has a right to
know about threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its
security. It also has a legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial
proceedings, particularly in matters of general public concern.
Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct
significance in debate and deliberation over questions of public
policy. °9
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
108. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (1983) (amended 1999).
109. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. (1983) (amended 1999).
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B. Interpretation of the Supreme Court of the United States: Gentile v.
State Bar of Nevada
With this long history as a background, the Supreme Court first
addressed the free speech rights of lawyers in the context of trial
publicity in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada.110 In that case, the
petitioner Dominic Gentile was an experienced Nevada criminal defense
lawyer who held a press conference soon after his client was indicted.Ill
During the press conference, he read a short statement and answered a
few questions. 12 The client was the owner of a storage facility where a
police safe deposit box was located. 1 3 He was indicted in connection
with the theft of a large quantity of cocaine and traveler's checks from
that deposit box. 14 At the time of the press conference, the client had
been the subject of media attention for about a year. 115 The media had
been generally favorable to the police and portrayed the client as a
suspect in previous thefts and as uncooperative during the
investigation. 116
Gentile argued that the press conference was simply an attempt to
respond to local press reports that were prejudicial to his client. 117 In
fact, the night before the press conference, Gentile and two other
lawyers studied the applicable rule on trial publicity to make sure his
statements complied with it. 118 During the press conference, Gentile
asserted that his client was innocent, that he was being used as a
scapegoat by a corrupt police force, and that a certain police officer was
the more likely suspect in the theft. 119 He also gave a description of his
defense strategy. 2 ° The case proceeded to trial and the court did not
have any problems impaneling a jury. Neither party requested a change
of venue or a continuance. There was no claim of prejudice caused by
publicity at any time. 121  At voir dire, none of the potential jurors
110. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (plurality opinion).
Ill. Id. at 1033 (plurality opinion).
112. Id. at 1063-64 (plurality opinion).
113. Id. at 1039-40 (plurality opinion).
114. Id. at 1039-42 (plurality opinion).
115. Id. at 1039-41 (plurality opinion).
116. Id. (plurality opinion).
117. Id. at 1042-43 (plurality opinion).
118. Id. at 1044 (plurality opinion).
119. Id. at 1045-46 (plurality opinion).
120. Id. at 1045 (plurality opinion).
121. Id. at 1047 (plurality opinion).
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recalled Gentile's press conference. 122  Gentile's client was eventually
acquitted of all charges. 1
23
Ten months after the press conference and four months after a jury
acquitted Gentile's client, the State Bar of Nevada filed a complaint
against Gentile for allegedly violating Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177,
which was virtually identical to ABA Model Rule 3.6.124 At the time,
the rule in Nevada prohibited an attorney from making a statement if the
lawyer "knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding." 125
However, the rule goes on to list certain types of statements that
attorneys could make "notwithstanding" the general ban. 126  Gentile
argued that he made an effort to ensure that his statements fell within
this "safe harbor" provision of the rule. 127 However, the southern
Nevada disciplinary board held that Gentile knew or should have known
that there was a substantial likelihood that his comments would
materially prejudice the proceeding. 128 The Nevada Supreme Court
later affirmed the board's decision, finding that Gentile had violated the
rule and imposed a private reprimand, the lowest possible sanction.
129
As a result, Gentile appealed arguing that Nevada Rule 177 infringed
upon his right to free speech and the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed, in a complicated decision with two separate majority
opinions. 130
122. Id. (plurality opinion).
123. Id. (plurality opinion).
124. As it read at the time, Nevada Rule 177(1) prohibited an attorney from making "an
extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of
public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding." Id. at app. B, at
1060. Section (2) listed the types of statements that would ordinarily result in material prejudice
and section (3) listed the types of statements that could be made "notwithstanding" the previous
two sections. See id. at app. B, at 1061-62.
125. Id. at app. B, at 1060.
126. Id. at 1062 (plurality opinion).
127. Id. at 1048-49 (plurality opinion).
128. Id. at 1064-65 (plurality opinion).
129. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 787 P.2d 386 (Nev. 1990).
130. Justice Kennedy announced the judgment of the Court and wrote the opinion of the Court
as to the issue of the unconstitutionality of Nevada Rule 177 as interpreted and applied by the
Nevada Supreme Court. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1048-51 (plurality opinion). Justices Marshall,
Blackmun and Stevens joined Kennedy's opinion in full. Id. at 1032 (plurality opinion). Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the Court as to the issue of the constitutionality of the
"reasonable likelihood standard." Id. at 1062-76 (plurality opinion). Justices White, Scalia and
Souter joined the Chief Justice's opinion in full. Id. at 1062 (plurality opinion). Justice
O'Connor concurred with both opinions, providing the fifth vote. Id. at 1081-82 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). She sided with Justice Kennedy on the issue of the interpretation and application of
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The Supreme Court was split on two different issues. Justice
Kennedy wrote an opinion reversing the sanctions and holding Nevada
Rule 177 void for vagueness as interpreted and applied by the Nevada
Supreme Court. 13 1  This opinion was joined by Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens 132 and Justice O'Connor concurred with the
judgment. 133 The second issue in the case was whether the "substantial
likelihood standard" was constitutional. 134 On this issue, Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Justices White,
Scalia, and Souter joined, 135 and Justice O'Connor concurred. 136
Justice Kennedy's opinion was based on the interpretation of what he
considered to be conflicting messages in the text of the rule. He held
that the use of the word "notwithstanding" in the safe harbor provision
of the rule could mislead an attorney into thinking that he or she could
issue comments of the type mentioned in the rule without fear of
sanctions. 137  Given that Gentile's comments did fall within the
language of the rule and that the Nevada Supreme Court found that he
had violated the rule, Kennedy concluded that the application of the rule
was invalid for vagueness. 138 As Gentile made an effort to comply with
the rule but ultimately could not, Justice Kennedy concluded that the
rule created "a trap for the wary as well as the unwary"' 139 because it
failed to give attorneys enough guidance as to when speech was
protected.14
0
On the question of the appropriate constitutional standard, Chief
Justice Rehnquist specifically rejected the claim that the state could
only discipline an attorney if there was a "clear and present danger" that
the attorney's statements would affect the fairness of the proceeding.'
4
'
He concluded that the restraint on attorneys' speech was content neutral
and narrowly tailored because it was applied only to speech that was
the rule and with the Chief Justice on the issue of the applicable standard. Id. (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
131. Id. at 1048-51 (plurality opinion).
132. Id. at 1032 (plurality opinion).
133. Id. at 1082 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 1051-52 (plurality opinion).
135. Id. at 1062-76 (plurality opinion).
136. Id. at 1081-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 1048 (plurality opinion).
138. Id. (plurality opinion).
139. Id. at 1051 (plurality opinion).
140. Id. at 1048 (plurality opinion).
141. Id. at 1074 (plurality opinion).
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substantially likely to have a prejudicial effect.' 42  According to the
Chief Justice, the limitations on speech were narrowly aimed at two
principal evils: comments that could influence the outcome of a trial and
comments that could prejudice the jury venire.143 Because he thought
that voir dire may not be effective in filtering out all the effects of
pretrial publicity, he concluded that unless speech is limited under the
circumstances, both evils would result in the violation of fundamental
rights under the Constitution.1 4 Speaking for the Court, therefore, he
held that states could impose sanctions on a lawyer for extrajudicial
statements that had a "substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing
[an adjudicative] proceeding."' 145
Gentile has attracted much criticism over the years. 146 In the end, the
Court's opinion does not provide clear guidelines to help courts
determine the constitutionality of the ability of a state to regulate in the
area of trial publicity. 147 Taken together, the opinions in Gentile did not
lead the Court to strike down the rule on its face. It only found the rule
unconstitutional in its application. In fact, even Justice Kennedy
declined to find the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice
142. Id. at 1075-76 (plurality opinion). The Chief Justice found support for this view based
upon two main arguments: first, that lawyers have special access to information and thus their
comments are particularly likely to prejudice the proceedings, and second, that lawyers are
"officers of the court" and subject to control by the courts. Id. at 1074 (plurality opinion).
Rehnquist's analysis is based on a balancing of the First Amendment rights of attorneys and the
states' interests, but his balancing does not start from an even balance because attorneys are
"officers of the court" and, thus, a state may restrict their speech more than that of other citizens.
Id. at 1074-75 (plurality opinion). According to the Chief Justice, a majority of state interests
would weigh in favor of allowing restrictions on attorney speech by using a standard lower than
the traditional one based on a "clear and present danger." Id. (plurality opinion).
143. Id. at 1075 (plurality opinion).
144. Id. (plurality opinion).
145. Id. at 1076.
146. See, e.g., Berkowitz-Caballero, supra note 85, at 499; L. Cooper Campbell, Gentile v.
State Bar and Model Rule 3.6: Overly Broad Restrictions on Attorney Speech and Pretrial
Publicity, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 583 (1993); Cole & Zacharias, supra note 33, at 1672-75;
Suzanne F. Day, The Supreme Court's Attack on Attorney's Freedom of Expression: The Gentile
v. State Bar of Nevada Decision, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1347, 1350-51 (1993) (describing
Gentile as "a confusing melange of statements from two disagreeing opinions" and arguing that
the decision leaves attorneys with little practical guidance concerning the possible range of their
speech outside the courtroom); Don J. DeBenedictis, Gentile's Unanswered Questions, A.B.A. J.,
Apr. 1993, at 28; Gregg, supra note 4; Julie Gannon Shoop, To Speak or Not to Speak: Lawyers
Test the Limits of Their Speech Rights, TRIAL, Sept. 1993, at 12; see also Joel Swift, Model Rule
3.6: An Unconstitutional Regulation of Defense Attorney Trial Publicity, 64 B.U. L. REV. 1003,
1005 n.13, 1031-47 (1984) (supporting the fact that there continues to be much debate over the
constitutionality of regulating trial publicity); Thiesen, supra note 39, at 848-52.
147. C. Thomas Vasaly, the first assistant director of the Minnesota Lawyers Professional
Responsibility Board, was once cited as saying of Gentile: "One sort of understands it for about
five minutes and then it fades away." DeBenedictis, supra note 146, at 28.
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standard" facially deficient because it could be interpreted in a manner
"consistent with the First Amendment." 148  Yet, it is difficult to
understand how the rule can be consistent with the First Amendment if
it can result in sanctions for protected speech. On the other hand, it has
been argued that the disposal of the sanctions on grounds of vagueness
should have ended the case, and that, therefore, the discussion of the
broader constitutional issue was unnecessary. 149  Finally, it has been
said that Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion may negatively affect
criminal defense representation. 150  However, most of the commentary
generated by Gentile has focused on whether the Court erred in
recognizing the use of a "substantial likelihood" standard in a case that
implicated First Amendment rights. 151
C. Gentile's Aftermath: Amendments to the Rules
All criticism aside, two things were clear after Gentile. First,
discipline imposed based on the "reasonable likelihood" standard of
Model Rule 3.6 would not withstand constitutional attack. Second,
although the standard would be considered facially constitutional,
discipline based on it would be examined closely to determine if the
rule was applied constitutionally. With these concerns in mind, and in
response to the debate generated by Gentile, the ABA and those
jurisdictions whose rules could be subject to the same analysis once
again attempted to redraft the applicable rules to make sure they would
pass constitutional scrutiny.
152
During the process, two differing views or approaches to trial
publicity rules emerged. Some states chose to use a strict standard
along the lines of the "clear and present danger test." Under this
standard a lawyer may not be punished unless the challenged statement
148. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1038 (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy stated: "Interpreted in a
proper and narrow manner ... the phrase substantial likelihood of material prejudice might
punish only speech that creates a danger of imminent and substantial harm." Id. at 1036 (plurality
opinion).
149. Berkowitz-Caballero, supra note 85, at 521.
150. One commentator has noted that the opinion "raises fears that trial publicity rules will
compromise the quality of criminal defense representation by discouraging lawyers from
speaking publicly about their cases." Id. at 499.
151. See supra note 146 (citing relevant articles).
152. During the drafting process the ABA Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility
considered whether the new rule should (1) apply only in criminal cases, (2) apply only in jury
trials, (3) apply only during trials, (4) have a safe harbor provision, (5) be directed at specific
evils rather than at "prejudice," (6) incorporate a clear and present danger standard, (7) require
separate standards for prosecutors, (8) apply only to lawyers engaged in the case, and (9) allow
attorneys a right of reply to publicity prejudicial to their client's interests. Berkowitz-Caballero,
supra note 85, at 538 n.256.
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poses a serious and imminent threat of interference with the
administration of justice. 153  In contrast, other states retained a lower
threshold for discipline based on "reasonable likelihood of prejudice."
Under this approach the state could punish the lawyer for statements
that have a reasonable likelihood of interference with the judicial
process. Illinois adopted the first approach. The ABA adopted the
second one.
In response to the holding in Gentile, the ABA modified Model Rule
3.6 in several ways. First, subsection (a) was amended to apply only to
attorneys who participate or have participated in the litigation. 154
Second, the drafters eliminated the provisions that the Court determined
were invalid for vagueness. For example, the words "notwithstanding"
and "without elaboration" were eliminated from the text of the rule and
the phrase "general nature of the claim or defense" was changed to "the
claim, offense or defense involved."'155 Third, the section of the rule
that listed the types of statements that could result in discipline was
moved from the text of the rule and placed in the comment. 156 Fourth,
the rule recognized a new right to reply to prejudicial publicity in
certain circumstances. 157 Fifth, a new paragraph was added to extend
subsection (a) to lawyers "associated" with a lawyer who is or had been
involved in the case. 158 Finally, the comment to the rule was amended
to suggest that the nature of the proceeding should be taken into account
in determining prejudice. 159 The ABA also modified Model Rule 3.8(g)
to include a specific provision applicable to prosecutors. 160
153. E.g., COLO. R.P.C. 3.6 (1997) (requiring substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing
an adjudicative proceeding); D.C. BAR R. 3.6 (1991) (requiring serious and imminent threat to
the impartiality of a judge or jury); ME. BAR R. 3.7(j) (1986) (requiring substantial danger of
interference with the administration of justice); N.D. R.P.C. 3.6 (1998) (requiring serious and
imminent threat of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding); OR. CODE P.R. DR 7-107
(1988) (requiring serious and imminent threat to the fact finding process in an adjudicative
proceeding); VA. SUP. CT. R. DR 7-106 (1994) (requiring clear and present danger of interfering
with the fairness of the trial by a jury).
154. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (1983) (amended 1994).
155. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(b)(1) (1983) (amended 1994). Under the
original rule, the phrase "without elaboration" was used as a limitation on an attorney's ability to
speak. Thus, ironically, in an attempt to clarify the extent of the limits on speech, the drafters of
the new rule eliminated one of the restrictions on speech.
156. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. para. 5 (1983) (amended 1994). The
drafters also changed the language that describes the types of statements in the list from
statements that "ordinarily" would be likely to violate the rule to statements that are "more likely
than not" to do so. Id.
157. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(c) (1983) (amended 1994).
158. MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(d) (1983) (amended 1994).
159. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. para. 6 (1983) (amended 1994).
160. MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(g) (1983) (amended 1994).
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Although it took a bit more time to achieve, Illinois also amended its
rules. In June 1998, the Illinois Supreme Court Committee on
Professional Responsibility submitted proposed amendments to Rules
3.6, 3.8, and 4.2 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct to the
Illinois Supreme Court Rules Committee. The Rules Committee then
scheduled a public hearing for the discussion of the amendments and
requested written comments. The hearing was held in January 1999 and
in October of that year, after considering the matters raised at the
hearing and the submitted comments, the Supreme Court issued an
order adopting the proposed amendments to Rules 3.6 and 3.8 and
rejecting the amendment to Rule 4.2.161 According to the order, the
amendments were scheduled to become effective on December 1,
1999.162
These amendments were not well received by all. On November 22,
1999 a number of state and federal prosecutors filed an ex parte petition
to reconsider the court's order. 163 Although the proceeding requested
by the petition was apparently not recognized by any of the Rules of the
court, it requested the Committee on Professional Responsibility to file
a response. 164 The committee did so, and the court subsequently denied
the petition without explanation in March 2000 and ordered that the
rules immediately take effect. 165
In contrast with the ABA amendments, Illinois did not adopt the
"reasonable likelihood standard" discussed in Gentile. The provisions
of Illinois Rule 3.6 apply only to statements that pose a "serious and
imminent threat" to the fairness of a proceeding. 166  Otherwise, the
161. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, Devine v. Robinson, 131 F. Supp.
2d 963 (N.D. I11. 2001) (No. 00-CV-4974).
162. Id.
163. Id. app. D, at I (Petition for Reconsideration and Stay Effect and Enforcement of
Amended Rules of Professional Conduct).
164. Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Complaint or to Stay Proceedings
at 1, Devine v. Robinson, 131 F. Supp. 2d 963 (N.D. I1. 2001) (No. 00-CV-4974).
165. Northcutt, supra note 23, at 55, 58. One issue before the court in Devine was whether
this action by the court in this "proceeding" should be considered an "adjudication" so that it
could be said that the Supreme Court construed the rules for purposes of abstention. Motion to
Dismiss Complaint or to Stay Proceedings at 3, Devine v. Robinson, 131 F. Supp. 2d 963 (N.D.
Ill. 2001) (No. 00-CV-4974).
166. ILL. SUP. CT. R.P.C. 3.6(a) (2000). This section of the rule states:
A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a
matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect
to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that it would pose a serious and imminent threat to the fairness
of an adjudicative proceeding.
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changes to the Illinois rules are similar to those approved by the ABA.
First, the drafters limited Rule 3.6's applicability to statements "that a
reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public
communication." 167 The rule was also limited to attorneys who
participated in the case. 168  Second, section (b) of Rule 3.6 was
amended to include a list of subjects that would pose a serious and
imminent threat to the fairness of the proceeding. 169 Interestingly, this
list is equivalent to the one eliminated by the ABA from Model Rule
3.6. Third, Illinois Rule 3.6(c) is now virtually identical to the safe
harbor provision included in ABA Model Rule 3.6(b). 170  Fourth, Rule
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. ILL. SUP. CT. R.P.C. 3.6(b). This section reads:
(b) There are certain subjects which would pose a serious and imminent threat to the
fairness of a proceeding, particularly when they refer to a civil matter triable to a jury,
or a criminal matter. These subjects relate to:
(1) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a
criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected
testimony of a party or witness;
(2) in a criminal case, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the
existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a
defendant or suspect or that person's failure to make a statement;
(3) the performance or results of any examination or test or the failure of a person
to submit to an examination or test, or the nature of physical evidence expected to
be presented;
(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a
criminal case;
(5) information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be
inadmissible as evidence in a trial, or
(6) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is
included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation
and that the defendant is presumed innocent unless proven guilty.
Id.
170. ILL. SUP. CT. R.P.C. 3.6(c) reads:
(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may state:
(1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law,
the identity of the persons involved and;
(2) information contained in a public record;
(3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress;
(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary
thereto;
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when
there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an
individual or to the public interest; and
(7) in a criminal case in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6):
(i) the identity, residence, occupation, and family status of the accused,
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3.6(d) recognizes a limited right to reply equivalent to the one in Model
Rule 3.6(c). 7 ' Finally, in order to limit the rights of prosecutors,
Illinois added two new sections to Rule 3.8.172
IV. EXTRAJUDICIAL PUBLICITY AND THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR
Prosecutors have an important and distinct role in the American
criminal justice system. 173 Prosecutors do not represent the victims of
crime, the police or the government. They represent the people or the
community. Interestingly, this includes the accused, which is why, as
explained by the Supreme Court in Berger v. United States,174 the
(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in
apprehension of that person,
(iii) the fact, time, and place of arrest, and
(iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the
length of the investigation.
ILL. SUP. CT. R.P.C. 3.6(c).
171. ILL. SuP. CT. R.P.C. 3.6(d), which reads:
Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable
lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue
prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client.
A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is
necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.
ILL. SUP. CT. R.P.C. 3.6(d).
172. ILL. SUP. CT. R.P.C. 3.8(c), (d), which reads:
(c) In addition to his or her obligations under Rule 3.6, a public prosecutor or other
government lawyer in criminal litigation shall exercise reasonable care to prevent
investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or
associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial
statement that the public prosecutor or other government lawyer would be forbidden
from making under Rule 3.6.
(d) The prosecutor in a criminal case shall refrain from making extrajudicial
comments that would pose a serious and imminent threat of heightening public
condemnation of the accused, except for statements that are necessary to inform the
public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate
law enforcement purpose
ILL. SUP. CT. R.P.C. 3.8(c), (d).
173. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner & James Geoffrey Durham, Towards Resolving Prosecutor
Conflicts of Interest, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 415 (1993); Terry D. Edwards, Police Legal
Advisors-Friend or Foe? Ethical Dilemmas in 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 Litigation, 17 J. LEGAL
PROF. 143 (1992); Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators
Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69 (1995); Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The
Prosecutor, The Press and Free Speech, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 865 (1990); Jerry E. Norton,
Government Attorneys' Ethics in Transition, 72 JUDICATURE 299 (1989); Donald J. Rose,
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 6 GE 0. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1067 (1993); Fred C. Zacharias,
Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 169 (1997); Fred C. Zacharias;
Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of
Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223 (1993) (discussing issues facing prosecutors).
174. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply
that of an advocate. 175
Because of their role, prosecutors also have much more public
exposure and influence. There is no question that in a high profile case
any extrajudicial statement by a prosecutor is likely to be widely
disseminated. Indeed, it has been argued repeatedly that prosecutors
traditionally have had much more access to the media than have defense
lawyers. 176  Thus, some commentators have argued that prosecutors'
statements are typically more likely to influence prospective jurors. For
this reason, it has been argued that prosecutors are more likely to violate
the rules on extrajudicial publicity more often than defense counsel. 177
Oddly, under the approach of the Model Code and the Model Rules
before Gentile was decided, prosecutors had much more freedom to
reach the media than defense attorneys. 178
Assuming it is true that prosecutors have more of an opportunity to
create unfairness in a proceeding by making extrajudicial statements
and given that prosecutors are expected to work for justice, it is
particularly important to regulate their conduct. 179  Although it is
175. Id. Justice Sutherland stated:
The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do
so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as
much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
Id.
176. See Gregg, supra note 4, at 1327 n. 18 (stating that the media gets most of its information
about criminal cases from prosecutors); Swift, supra note 146, at 1005 n.13, 1031-47 (1984)
(analyzing trial publicity cases and concluding that most potentially prejudicial statements came
from prosecutors and police).
177. CRYSTAL, supra note 5, at 259 ("Public comment by prosecutors poses a greater risk of
danger to the impartiality of decisionmakers than statements by defense counsel because the
public is more likely to give credence to statements by public officials than by defense counsel.");
WOLFRAM, supra note 9, at 635 (stating that prosecutors statements are typically much more
likely to influence prospective jurors); Hellman, supra note 39, at 45 ("[S]tatements by
prosecutors or law enforcement officials associated with prosecutors are among the statements
most likely to be prejudicial to the fairness of an adjudicatory proceeding.").
178. See supra Part II (comparing the Model Code and the Model Rules).
179. This concern was well summarized by Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion in
Stroble v. California, almost forty years ago when he stated:
To have the prosecutor himself feed the press with evidence that no self restrained
press ought to publish in anticipation of a trial is to make the State itself through the
prosecutor, who wields its power, a conscious participant in trial by newspaper, instead
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essential that indictments be subject to public scrutiny, 180 it has been
argued that "there is no legitimate reason for a prosecutor, as an agent
of the government, to engage in pretrial publicity that heightens the
public condemnation of the accused." 181  For these reasons, some
commentators have gone so far as to argue that trial publicity rules
should apply only to prosecutors, because criminal defense lawyers, as
opposed to prosecutors, require access to publicity in order to counter
adverse publicity about the accused. 182
The ABA rejected this view, but it did take a step to impose greater
restrictions on prosecutors. 183 The ABA's approach, explained in ABA
Model Rule 3.8, focuses on the detriment an accused faces when extra-
judicial statements are made:
In the context of a criminal prosecution, a prosecutor's extrajudicial
statement can create the additional problem of increasing public
condemnation of the accused. Although the announcement of an
indictment, for example, will necessarily have severe consequences
for the accused, a prosecutor can, and should, avoid comments which
have no legitimate law enforcement purpose and have a substantial
likelihood of increasing public opprobrium of the accused.' 84
This approach was also followed by the Supreme Court of Illinois,
which approved two new sections to Illinois Rule 3.8. Section 3.8(d)
states that a prosecutor "shall refrain from making extrajudicial
comments that would pose a serious and imminent threat of heightening
public condemnation of the accused, except for statements that are
necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the
of by those methods which centuries of experience have shown to be indispensable to
the fair administration of justice.
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 201 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). It is important,
however, to make sure the rules used to limit speech by prosecutors are narrowly drawn and fairly
applied. In a leading article on the subject published before the Supreme Court's decision in
Gentile, the author suggested that rules controlling prosecutor speech "should address the degree
of harm, burden of proof, knowledge and intent of the speaker, timing of the speech, and identify
the factfinder." Matheson, supra note 173, at 931.
180. As Monroe Freedman has stated, "secret indictments are familiar weapons of tyrannous
governments." MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 230 (1990).
181. Id.
182. WOLFRAM, supra note 9, at 635 n.5.
183. In their report to the ABA House of Delegates, the ABA Ethics Committee and the ABA
Criminal Justice section stated: "Because of a prosecutor's special power and visibility, a
prosecutor should use special care to avoid ... publicity." ABA ANN. MODEL RULES 382
(1999).
184. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(g) cmt. para. 5 (1983) (amended 1994).
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prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement
purpose."' 185 Section 3.8(c) states that
[i]n addition to his or her obligations under Rule 3.6, a public
prosecutor or government lawyer in criminal litigation shall exercise
reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel,
employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor
in the criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that would
be forbidden under Rule 3.6.186
However, not all prosecutors accepted these changes. Soon after the
enactment of the new Illinois trial publicity rules a group of prosecutors
challenged their constitutionality.
A. The Challenge to the New Illinois Rules
After a failed attempt to get the Illinois Supreme Court to stay the
effect and enforcement of the new rules, 187 in October, 2001 ten State's
Attorneys from ten different counties 188 in Illinois filed a complaint,
Devine v. Robinson in Federal District Court. 189 The complaint
requested declaratory and injunctive relief arguing that the new rules are
overbroad and vague, and that they impose inconsistent restrictions on
speech by prosecutors.190 They argued that the rules chill speech and
impede the prosecutors' function of public disclosure and education.
191
According to this argument, prosecutors are required by the inherent
duties of their office to "routinely and regularly provide public
information respecting investigations, prosecutions and the justice
system while respecting and protecting the rights of the public and
accused parties to the fair administration of justice."'192  Thus, the
185. ILL. SUP. CT. R.P.C. 3.8(e) (2000).
186. ILL. SUP. CT. R.P.C. 3.8(c) (2000): see also supra note 169 (listing factors that could be
potential threats to the fairness of a proceeding).
187. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text (explaining opposition to the
amendments).
188. The action was brought by State's Attorneys in the counties of Cook, Morgan, DuPage,
Macon, Madison, St. Clair, Winnebago, Peoria, Champaign, and Lake. Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Devine v. Robinson, 131 F. Supp. 2d 963 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
(No. 00-CV-4974).
189. Id.
190. Id. The defendant in the case was Mary Robinson as Administrator of the Illinois
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC). The ARDC is the agency with
authority to investigate and prosecute attorneys for professional misconduct in Illinois. The
plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent Robinson, and the ARDC, from enforcing the new rules.
Devine, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 963.
191. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Devine v. Robinson, 131 F. Supp.
2d 963 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (No. 00-CV-4974); Motion to Dismiss Complaint or to Stay Proceedings
at 2, Devine (No. 00-CV-4974).
192. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Devine (No. 00-CV-4974).
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plaintiffs argued that the rules prohibit communications which are
constitutionally protected and which they must make in their roles as
prosecutors.
Additionally, the prosecutors argued that amended Rule 3.6 is
impermissibly vague and overbroad. They argued that the rule suffers
from the same shortcomings as the Nevada Rule of Professional
Conduct which was struck down by the United States Supreme Court in
Gentile because it fails to give sufficient guidance to attorneys
regarding what type of statements could and could not be made. 193 The
plaintiffs then argued that, even if amended Rule 3.6 was not void for
vagueness, it is unconstitutionally overboard because it fails to take into
account the timing of an attorney's public statement when determining
its propriety. 194  Also, the prosecutors argued that the right to reply
provision contained in Rule 3.6(d) is unconstitutional because it would
have a chilling effect on free speech. 195 Their position was that under
this provision, even if the threat of punishment were by itself
insufficient to silence an attorney, the fear of providing an opponent
with a right to respond would certainly serve to eliminate the desire to
make any public statement. 196  Therefore, because attorneys would
likely avoid making any public statements, the public's right to learn
about the workings of the justice system would be severely hindered in
both civil and criminal cases. 19
7
Finally, the petitioners attacked the constitutionality of Rule 3.8(c),
which requires prosecutors to exercise reasonable care to prevent other
persons assisting prosecutors from making statements that the
prosecutors would be forbidden from making under Rule 3.6.198 They
argued the rule was not valid, first, because it fails to specify which
prosecutor is responsible for ensuring compliance with this rule.
199
193. Id. at 5 (arguing rule 3.6(b) forces attorneys to guess at the rule's meaning).
194. Id. (arguing rule 3.6(b) is overbroad because it prohibits speech based on mere content
and without reference to its timing notwithstanding references in the rule to the need for "serious
and imminent" threats to the fairness of the adjudications).
195. Id. (arguing that rule 3.6(d) "compounds the chilling effects of Rule 3.6 because any
public commentary may potentially yield 'adverse publicity' which will unilaterally free one's
adversary from the Rule").
196. Id. at app. D, at 4.
197. Id. at 2 (arguing prosecutors are "required by the inherent duties of their office to
routinely and regularly provide public information respecting investigations, prosecutions and the
justice system while respecting and protecting the rights of the public and accused parties to the
fair administration of justice").
198. Id. at 7.
199. Id. at 6-7 (arguing rule 3.8(c) is void for vagueness because prosecutors must guess
which prosecutors are responsible for instructing third parties). In the Petition for
Reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs argued this point stating that:
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Second, the petitioners asserted that Rule 3.8(c) is unconstitutional
because it requires governmental agencies to suppress the speech of
others by threatening the attorneys with punishment, particularly when
the prosecutors do not have supervisory authority over the third
parties.20 0  Lastly, the petitioners asserted that the prohibition contained
in Rule 3.8(e) 201 is impermissibly vague because it fails to give clear
guidance as to what types of statements are permitted and is apparently
inconsistent with amended Rule 3.6(c).2 °2
In response to the complaint, Mary Robinson, the Administrator of
the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme
Court of Illinois filed a motion to dismiss. She argued that the federal
court should abstain from getting involved until the Supreme Court of
the state gives an interpretation of the rules. 20 3  Secondly, she argued
that the plaintiffs had failed to make a sufficient showing of a case or
controversy because the complaint did not show that the prosecutors
had suffered any actual or threatened injury as a result of the
Because this new provision does not identify which attorney is subject to discipline if a
violation occurs, it is apparently up to the discretion of the ARDC to target the
elected/appointed official who heads the prosecutorial agency, the First Assistant who
runs the office on a day-to-day basis, the supervisor in charge of the unit responsible
for approving or rejecting criminal charges, the attorney assigned to try the case at
some future date or the junior attorney assigned to determine whether or not there is
sufficient evidence to support a charge in a particular case. Or perhaps, the ARDC will
institute disciplinary proceedings against all of them.
Id. at app. D, at 4-5 (Petition for Reconsideration and Stay Effect and Enforcement of Amended
Rules of Professional Conduct 3.6 & 3.8).
200. Id. at 6 ("Rule 3.8(c) improperly uses prosecutors as proxies to extend the Supreme
Court's regulation of attorney conduct to the police officers, victims, witnesses medical personnel
and others "associated" persons who are not proper subjects for the Supreme Court's
regulation.").
201. Section (e) states that prosecutors,
shall refrain from making extrajudicial comments that would pose a serious and
imminent threat of heightening public condemnation of the accused, except for
statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the
prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose.
ILL. SuP. CT. R.P.C. 3.8(e) (2000).
202. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 7, Devine (No. 00-CV-4974) (arguing
Rule 3.8(d) "flatly contradicts" some provisions of Rule 3.6(c)).
203. The defendant claimed the fact that the Supreme Court denied the petition for
reconsideration did not mean the court "considered" or "interpreted" the rules. Robinson based
the argument on International College of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, 153 F.3d 356, 365 (7th
Cir. 1998) where, citing Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996), the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that abstention is appropriate when (1) there is a substantial
uncertainty as to the meaning of the state law and (2) there exists a reasonable probability that the
state court's clarification of state law might obviate the need for a federal constitutional ruling.
Motion to Dismiss Complaint or to Stay Proceedings at 4, Devine v. Robinson, 131 F. Supp. 2d
963 (N.D. I11. 2001) (No. 00-CV-4974).
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amendments to the rules of professional conduct. 20 4 She pointed out,
for example, that, although the plaintiffs argued that the new rules
resulted in a chilling effect on speech, the plaintiffs had not changed
their practice of making public communications about pending cases. 20 5
She also defended Rule 3.8(c), arguing that prosecutors must have an
ethical obligation to take reasonable steps to protect the process from
prejudicial publicity they may be able to forestall and that it is not
different from generally recognized duties of "supervision" as those
recognized in other rules of professional conduct such as Rule 5.3.206
The district court reviewed the arguments and granted the motion to
dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to allege a justiciable
case or controversy.2 °7 The court found that the plaintiffs failed to
identify what type of comments they wished to issue that would have
subjected them to prosecution under the rules. 20 8 Also, the court noted
that the plaintiffs did not allege any facts suggesting that a prosecution
was imminent under any interpretation of the rules.209 Thus, the court
concluded that the alleged injury may never materialize and the
complaint did not present a case or controversy. 210
In reaching its result, the court evaluated the plaintiffs' arguments,
and although it declined to actually decide whether the rules are
constitutional,211 it concluded that the rules could be "fairly interpreted
204. Motion to Dismiss Complaint or to Stay Proceedings at 3, Devine (No. 00-CV-4974).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 8. Rule 5.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states:
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the
professional obligations of the lawyer; and
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation
of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the
conduct involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the person is employed, or has
direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time
when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable
remedial action.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (1983) (amended 1999).
207. Devine v. Robinson, 131 F. Supp. 2d 963, 973 (N.D. I11. 2001).
208. id. at 969.
209. Id. at 972.
210. id. at 973.
211. id. at 972.
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in a manner that complies with the First Amendment." '212 First, the
court concluded that Rule 3.6(b) could be interpreted "as an illustrative
list of the kinds of subjects that are prohibited under subparagraph (a)"
and that once so interpreted there would not be any contradictions with
the provisions of the safe harbor section.2 13 Second, the court found
that Rule 3.8(c) was not vague because it does not have to "spell out a
prosecutor's obligations to every conceivable person in every
conceivable situation in order to avoid a vagueness challenge." 214 The
court analogized the provisions of the rule to the Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct that describe an attorney's supervisory duties such
as Rules 5.1 and 5.3.215 Third, the court rejected the argument that Rule
3.8(d) contradicts the safe harbor provision of Rule 3.6 because "each
part or section should be construed in connection with every other part
of [sic] section so as to produce a harmonious whole." 216 Finally, the
court found that the rule could be read to be limited in scope, thus
defeating the plaintiffs claim that the rule is overbroad. 217
Obviously, the court in Devine was attempting to avoid deciding the
constitutional question; thus, its review of the arguments was not
detailed. The court's "fair interpretation" of the rule, however, leaves
too many questions unanswered.
B. The New Illinois Rules: Interpretation and Suggestions
Neither the ABA nor any of the states seem to be considering the
elimination of the professional conduct rules that attempt to minimize
the dangers of trial publicity. However, given the debate regarding the
constitutionality of these types of rules, the first question that needs to
be addressed is whether it is a good idea to continue to approach the
problem of extrajudicial speech through professional regulation.
There is no question that states have a substantial interest in making
sure trials are fair, and that attorneys have an obligation to make sure
they do not cause prejudice to the administration of justice. States also
have an interest in protecting public confidence in the judicial system,
protecting the integrity of the process, making sure decisions are based
on the arguments and facts at trial, and in ensuring that attorneys do not
create administrative costs by forcing changes in venue, extensive voir
212. Id. at 969.
213. Id. at 970.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 971.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 972.
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dire, sequestration or other actions by courts to counter the effects of
their speech. Yet, the question remains whether these interests weigh in
favor of allowing restrictions on attorney speech.
This balancing may depend on whether the state interests are so
threatened by attorney speech that the regulation chosen to advance
those interests is justified. The fundamental rationale for the rules is
that extrajudicial trial publicity, specifically attorney speech, can be
especially prejudicial in adjudicative proceedings. Yet, the evidence
suggesting that attorney speech can have this effect is conflicting, at
best. For instance, the Supreme Court has overturned only a few cases
because of the effect of publicity and in none of them was attorney
speech an issue.218  In his opinion in Gentile, Chief Justice Rehnquist
found the "threat of prejudice" in the fact that the public may find
statements by attorneys more influential, authoritative or credible.219
However, he provided no actual proof that the public finds lawyers
more credible than other sources. Moreover, the Court has held already
that the First Amendment does not permit suppression of speech
because of its persuasive power.220  In fact, the opposite may be true.
Maybe the public knows to be skeptical of attorneys because the
attorneys are trying to represent the best interests of their clients. 221 In
addition, Justice Kennedy responded to Chief Justice Rehnquist's
argument by pointing out that the parties arguing to uphold the rule in
Gentile did not present "a single example where a defense attorney has
218. See supra notes 41-59 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of pretrial publicity
in several Supreme Court cases).
219. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991) (plurality opinion).
Interestingly, the Chief Justice does not mention that this same rationale to justify limiting speech
by attorneys had been rejected in Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer. Chi. Council of Lawyers
v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 250 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Cunningham v. Chi. Council
of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); see also infra note 254 and accompanying text (discussing
rejection of argument in Chicago Council of Lawyers).
220. In his opinion in Gentile, Justice Kennedy stated:
To the extent the press and public rely upon attorneys for information because
attorneys are well informed, this may prove the value to the public of speech by
members of the bar. If the dangers of their speech arise from its persuasiveness, from
their ability to explain judicial proceedings, or from the likelihood the speech will be
believed, these are not the sort of dangers that can validate restrictions. The First
Amendment does not permit suppression of speech because of its power to command
assent.
Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1056-57 (plurality opinion).
221. Thiesen, supra note 39, at 859 (suggesting there is no proof the public finds lawyers
more credible than other sources).
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managed by public statements to prejudice the prosecution of the State's
case."
222
In fact, the evidence on the affect of pretrial publicity on potential
jurors is, at best, inconclusive. Some studies have shown that jurors are
affected by pretrial publicity and that some of the traditional remedies,
such as instructions by the court, are not effective in eliminating this
result. For example, the juror studies performed by the "Free
Press-Fair Trial Project" in the early 1970s concluded that exposure to
prejudicial pretrial publicity would double the chance of a guilty
verdict. 223  However, the use of voir dire did help in controlling juror
prejudice. Without voir dire, seventy-eight percent of the jurors who
were exposed to prejudicial publicity voted for a guilty verdict.224 After
jury selection with voir dire, sixty percent of the jurors voted for a
guilty verdict. 225
The studies that claim to find clear evidence of prejudicial effect,
however, have been criticized as inconclusive and ineffective in
determining the relationship between news coverage and jury
influence. 226 One researcher, for example, noted that most jury studies
do not use real jurors as subjects, that the setting of the studies is not a
real trial and that the findings of the effect of publicity on jurors are
inaccurate because certain types of people are more predisposed to
222. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1055 (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy also discussed the
decision in Mu 'Min v. Virginia, concluding that it is difficult to imagine that there are statements
that could be made by an attorney that are so inflammatory that they would cause the need to
incur the costs the Chief Justice claimed justified the regulation. Id. at 1039 (plurality opinion)
(citing Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991)). In Mu'Min, the Court held that the
Constitution did not require a more extensive voir dire to ensure a fair trial despite widespread
publicity of facts and allegations that would be inadmissible at trial. Mu 'Min, 500 U.S. at 431-32.
In any case, such costs are rarely a problem since only a very small percentage of all criminal
cases actually receive significant media attention. Thiesen, supra note 39, at 859, 861 (citing a
1970 study in the District of Columbia which concluded that only about 2% of all cases received
enough publicity to even create the possibility of prejudice); see also Matheson, supra note 173,
at 866-67 n.3 (citing studies that found that of the crimes reported to police, the Chicago Tribune
reported on only .65 of 1%, Houston dailies published stories on no more than .75 of 1%, Detroit
newspapers reported 1.9% and Atlanta papers reported 3.19%).
223. Alice M. Padawer-Singer & Allen H. Barton, The Impact of Pretrial Publicity on Jurors'
Verdicts, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 125, 135 (1975).
224. Alice M. Padawer-Singer et al., Voir Dire by Two Lawyers: An Essential Safeguard, 57
JUDICATURE 386, 389 (1974).
225. Id.
226. Robb M. Jones, The Latest Empirical Studies on Pretrial Publicity, Jury Bias, and
Judicial Remedies-Not Enough to Overcome the First Amendment Right of Access to Pretrial
Hearings, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 841, 844 (1991).
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influence from outside sources. 227 Jury studies cannot use real criminal
proceedings and therefore cannot produce the sense of responsibility
that real jurors might feel.228 Also, the experimental exposure is not
diffused through competition with other messages experienced in real
life, such as television, radio, and newspapers. 229 Finally, many studies
have relied on survey methodology which does not clearly link pretrial
publicity and jury decision-making. 230
Moreover, many studies have concluded that pretrial publicity does
not have as much prejudicial effect on jurors and that there is little
correlation between guilty verdicts and prejudicial publicity. 23 1 Based
on a study conducted at the University of Minnesota, for example,
researchers concluded that even though pretrial publicity does affect the
subjects' initial judgments, the evidence suggested that the problems
created by pretrial publicity are diminished by the trial itself.232 The
study results demonstrated that "different pretrial publicity
manipulations produced effects of different magnitude." 233 The largest
effects were found to be when the negative pretrial publicity involved
the defendant's character.234  This type of pretrial publicity made
subjects more likely to say that the defendant was guilty prior to trial.235
However, while the pretrial publicity may have had significant effects
upon the subjects' pretrial judgments, the trial itself diminished greatly
227. Rita J. Simon, Does the Court's Decision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the Research
Evidence on the Impact on Jurors of News Coverage?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 515, 517, 520 (1977).
228. Schmidt, supra note 62, at 448.
229. Id.
230. Amy L. Otto et al., The Biasing Impact of Pretrial Publicity on Juror Judgments, 18
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 453,455 (1994).
231. F. Gerald Klein & Paul H. Jess, Prejudicial Publicity: Its Effects on Law School Mock
Juries, 43 JOURNALISM Q. 113 (1966), cited in Scott A. Hagan, KUTV v. Wilkinson: Another
Episode in the Fair Trial/Free Press Saga, UTAH L. REV. 739, 752-53 (1985); Simon, supra note
227, at 528 & n.60; see also Robert Dreschel, An Alternative View of Media-Judiciary Relations:
What the Non-Legal Evidence Suggests About the Fair Trial-Free Press Issue, 18 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1, 14-15 (1989) (discussing these studies); FREEDMAN, supra note 180, at 230 (arguing that
the notion that a defendant can deprive the government of a fair trial through the news media is, at
best, remote); Jones, supra note 226, at 844; John Kaplan, Of Babies and Bathwater, 29 STAN. L.
REV. 621, 623 (1977) (using surveys of actual jurors to conclude that publicity had almost no
impact on the jury); Otto et al., supra note 230, at 453-56. The Report of the ABA Advisory
Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press (the Reardon Report) states: "There are no determinative
empirical data that will supply ready answers to the questions of whether jurors can put aside
preconceived opinions, and abide by judges' instructions to decide only on the evidence of
record." Schmidt, supra note 62, at 445 n.71 (quoting the Reardon Report).
232. Otto et al., supra note 230, at 464-66.
233. Id. at 464.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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any effect of the pretrial publicity. 236  Of the five pretrial publicity
manipulations, not a single one had "significant direct effects on
subjects' post trial verdicts. 237
At least two other studies have found that the proportion of jurors
voting for a guilty verdict was virtually the same whether they had been
exposed to pretrial publicity or not, if they were instructed by a judge to
disregard the information.2 38An additional study showed that although
the experimental jurors were influenced by the publicity to which they
were exposed, most of them changed their minds after the trial process
and voted for not guilty verdicts.2 39  The researcher interpreted this
result to mean that the jurors took the judge's instructions seriously and
were able to put the prejudicial material out of their minds. 24° Using
surveys of actual jurors, another author has concluded that "newspaper
publicity, or any other assertions of the facts of a case made outside of
court, have virtually no impact upon the jury trying the case." 241
Finally, one researcher has summarized the evidence on this issue as
follows:
Experiments to date indicate that for the most part juries are able and
willing to put aside extraneous information and base their decisions on
the evidence. The results show that when ordinary citizens become
jurors, they assume a special role in which they apply different
standards of proof, more vigorous reasoning and greater
detachment.
242
Thus it can be concluded that empirical studies have not revealed a
strong connection between trial publicity and a threat to fair trials. 243 In
fact, in Gentile, it was assumed that the extrajudicial comments had no
effect on the jurors. Not a single juror indicated any recollection of
Gentile's press conference, there was no problem empaneling a jury and
neither party felt the need to request a continuance or change of
236. Id. at 465.
237. Id.
238. Simon, supra note 227, at 522-23.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 523.
241. Kaplan, supra note 231, at 623.
242. Simon, supra note 227, at 528.
243. Gregg, supra note 4, at 1364-66 (finding that prejudicial effect of publicity is
substantially weakened by presentation of evidence at trial); Simon, supra note 227, at 528
(concluding that studies to date show that, for the most part, jurors are able to put aside
extrajudicial information and base their decision on the evidence presented at trial); see also
Dreschel, supra note 231; Martin F. Kaplan, Cognitive Processes in the Individual Juror, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 197, 208-09 (1982); Swift, supra note 146, at 1031-49
(arguing that research reveals no instances in which criminal defense attorneys have been found
to have prejudiced an adjudication through their extrajudicial statements).
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venue. 244  Contrary to what Chief Justice Rehnquist argued in his
opinion in Gentile, it can be said that potential jurors rarely remember
the details of pretrial publicity by the day of the trial, and that even if
they do, they view what they read in the press and see on television with
healthy skepticism. 245 It can also be argued that the public knows
attorneys' roles when representing their clients and, thus, may actually
find their statements less reliable since they are perceived to be made in
the interests of the client.
Given that there is no conclusive evidence that extrajudicial
statements can cause prejudice, the application of the professional
responsibility rules that attempt to limit the effect of those statements
becomes problematic. Although the rules are directed to prohibit
statements that lawyers know or should know could be prejudicial, there
is little evidence that any statements are indeed prejudicial, thus making
the rules depend on speculation. Attorneys attempting to comply with
the rules would never, almost by definition, be able to know the effect
of the statements. Always in doubt as to whether their conduct would
be a violation of the rule, the result might be a chilling effect on
presumptively protected speech.
Moreover, when determining whether to approach the possible
problems created by extrajudicial speech, there is a strong argument that
suggests that the balancing should favor the attorney's right to speak.
The argument has three elements: the rules seek to preserve fairness in
the process at the expense of the attorney's ethical obligation to
zealously represent their clients, the rules affect the attorney's first
amendment rights of expression, and the rules interfere with the public's
right to be informed about matters of public concern.
Attorneys, by virtue of their involvement in a case and their training
as advocates, are frequently the most appropriate persons to speak
publicly on behalf of a client.246 In his opinion in Gentile, for example,
Justice Kennedy argued that:
An attorney's duties do not begin inside the courtroom door .... [A]n
attorney may take reasonable steps to defend a client's reputation and
reduce the adverse consequences of indictment ... including an
244. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1047 (1991) (plurality opinion). Justice
Kennedy concluded that the "[p]etitioner's judgment that no likelihood of material prejudice
would result from his comments was vindicated by events at trial." Id. (plurality opinion).
245. RICHARD A. ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
399 (1995).
246. Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 250 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub
nom. Cunningham v. Chi. Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
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attempt to demonstrate in the court of public opinion that the client
does not deserve to be tried.247
Ethics professor Monroe Freedman has also advanced the same view as
follows:
The First Amendment right to freedom of speech is never more
important to an individual than when he or she is the accused in a
criminal prosecution. The prosecutor is privileged to publish to the
world.., what in most other circumstances would be grounds for a
libel action.... There can be no more pressing occasion, therefore, for
immediate, effective public rebuttal.24 8
Other commentators have added that by speaking out on behalf of
clients, attorneys strengthen the attorney client relationship and the
client's confidence in the representation, thus improving the attorney's
ability to put forth a better defense. 249
Second, restrictions on speech may end up limiting or eliminating
more speech than needed. Allowing extrajudicial speech provides
access to important information and facilitates public scrutiny of the
judicial process.250  Given the lack of evidence on the prejudicial effect
of extrajudicial speech by attorneys, the rules may discourage speech
that would not threaten state interests significantly and which could be
socially and politically valuable. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated that public scrutiny of the judicial process is an
effective restraint on the possible abuse of judicial power which
enhances the quality and integrity of the system.25' Dominic Gentile's
247. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1043 (plurality opinion).
248. FREEDMAN, supra note 180, at 228.
249. Cole & Zacharias, supra note 33, at 1648.
250. See Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978) (stating that the
operations of the courts and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern);
Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Commentary
and reporting on the criminal justice system is at the core of First Amendment values, for the
operation and integrity of that system is of crucial import to citizens concerned with the
administration of government."); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (stating that the
press guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors and judicial
processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism); see also supra notes 21-22, 32 (discussing
different interpretations of the First Amendment and its role in the discussion of government
affairs).
251. For example, in In re Oliver, the Court recognized that while the right to a public trial is
guaranteed to the accused, publicity also provides various benefits to the public, including the fact
that through public trials the public learns about the government. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270-
71 (1948). The Court stated: "Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison
of publicity, all other checks are of small account." Id. at 271. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, the Court
stated: "The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial process to extensive
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comments, for example, alerted the public about the possibility of a
corrupt police force. 252 Justice Kennedy emphasized this view in his
opinion in Gentile when he stated:
[O]ne central point must dominate the analysis: this case involves
classic political speech. The State Bar of Nevada reprimanded
petitioner for his assertion, supported by a brief sketch of his client's
defense, that the State sought the indictment and conviction of an
innocent man as a "scapegoat" and had not "been honest enough to
indict the people who did it; the police department, crooked cops."...
At issue here is the constitutionality of a ban on political speech
critical of the government and its officials.
253
Likewise, in civil cases, extrajudicial speech may be needed to
disseminate important information about class actions or dangerous
products. Foreshadowing the argument against secrecy in civil
litigation, for example, the court in Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
Bauer stated:
Attorneys' statements are often the source of prejudicial publicity,
especially since their views and comments are usually accepted by the
public on the basis that they come from a wellspring of reliable
information. Restricting such comment can be a significant aid in
controlling publicity which may affect the fairness of a trial .... Yet,
there are important countervailing factors. Since lawyers are
considered credible in regard to pending litigation in which they are
engaged and are in one of the most knowledgeable positions, they are
a crucial source of information and opinions .... And despite our
primary focus on prejudicial statements, we must keep in mind that
there are important areas of public concern connected with current
litigation. We can note that lawyers involved in investigations or
public scrutiny and criticism." Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 350. In Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, the
Court stated:
Great responsibility is ... placed upon the news media to report fully and accurately
the proceedings of government, . . . and documents open to the public are the basic data
of governmental operations. Without the information provided by the press most of us
and many of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register
opinions on the administration of government generally. With respect to judicial
proceedings in particular, the function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of
trials and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the
administration of justice.
Cox Broad. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (discussing that access to criminal trials is significant in the
functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole).
252. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1034 (plurality opinion).
253. Id. (plurality opinion).
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trials often are in a position to act as a check on government by
exposing abuses or urging action.
254
Given these arguments and the fact that there is really no bright-line
rule for determining when an extrajudicial statement is proper, any
determination of the issue will necessarily involve an after the fact
balancing of First Amendment interests, the duties of diligence and
zealous advocacy, and the preservation of our system of justice and
fairness of trials. This being the case, it is worth considering whether a
better approach would be to allow courts to issue case by case orders
"capable of being molded to the circumstances" which would be "more
likely to be effective in serving the state's interest in delivering fair
trials without unnecessarily suppressing ... speech . . . or limiting the
public's ability to be informed about matters of legitimate interest."
255
One possible alternative is to eliminate the rule altogether and
emphasize the courts' inherent power to regulate the conduct of
attorneys who practice before them. This way judges could consider the
specific facts and circumstances of each particular case and issue
narrowly tailored guidelines giving attorneys a fair warning as to what
would be allowed.256 Obviously, the disadvantage of this approach is
that attorneys would not have the guidelines available before they made
the statements. Also, forcing attorneys to seek permission before
speaking in every case could be interpreted as a form of pre-publication
review which is a classic example of an unconstitutional system of prior
restraints.257
254. Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 250 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub
nom. Cunningham v. Chi. Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
255. Hellman, supra note 39, at 28.
256. Ronald Rotunda, Can You Say That?, TRIAL, Dec. 1994, at 20.
257. The Supreme Court has defined a prior restraint as any prohibition on speech issued in
advance of publication. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 721 (1931). According to the prior
restraint doctrine, "the government may not restrain a particular expression prior to its
dissemination even though the same expression could be constitutionally subjected to punishment
after dissemination." MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
127 (1984). Originally, the phrase "prior restraint" was used to describe an administrative
licensing system which allowed the state to determine what could be published in advance.
Through the analysis of the Supreme Court, however, the prior restraints doctrine has been
extended to statutes that allow suppression of speech, to injunctions issued by courts after full
hearings and to temporary restraining orders. See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539
(1976) (banning publication of information implicating the accused in a criminal trial); Near, 283
U.S. at 721 (finding a statute that allowed suppression of a newspaper after a hearing in court
unconstitutional). The doctrine is not related to the substance of the speech but to the effect that
the government's method of regulation will have on speech. In Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
Bauer, the court suggested that prior restraints are defined by four elements: (1) a governmental
order that restrains specified expression; (2) the order must be obeyed until reversed; (3) the
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Evidently, the Supreme Court of Illinois has already decided that this
will not be the approach taken in this state. It is very unlikely that the
court will dispose of the new rules at this point. However, the court
should consider some suggestions that will help clarify certain aspects
of the rules and prevent further attacks on their constitutional validity.
1. Should the Rule Have a List of Statements that are Categorically
"Impermissible"?
When the ABA redrafted Model Rule 3.6 in response to Gentile, it
did it in order to eliminate the list of types of statements that were
,'more likely than not" to cause prejudice to an adjudicative proceeding
from the text of the rule and placed it in the comment." 8 The new
Illinois Rule 3.6, on the other hand, still contains a similar list in its
subsection (b) and, despite the interpretation in Devine, the items on the
list are most likely categorically impermissible. 259 This subsection will
most likely give rise to problems in the interpretation and application of
the rule in the future.
First of all, it is not completely clear how the section should be
interpreted. The defendant in Devine argued that section (b) only meant
to "caution[] attorneys as to certain topics which may lead to a 'serious
and imminent threat' to the fairness of an adjudicative proceeding." 26°
The court in Devine adopted this view and suggested that the rule could
be interpreted "as an illustrative list of the kinds of subjects that are
prohibited under subparagraph (a). 261 This interpretation of the rule
would, of course, solve some of the issues; but there are problems with
this suggestion. First of all, this interpretation is contrary to the letter of
violation of the order may be punished as contempt; and (4) the proceedings conducted for its
violation do not include all the safeguards of a criminal trial, including the fact that the violator
cannot argue the constitutionality of the order as a defense to its violation. Chi. Council of
Lawyers, 522 F.2d at 248. The court, however, rejected the argument that the trial publicity rule
at issue in that case, which was based on the ABA Model Code DR 7-107, operated as a prior
restraint on speech. Id. at 248-49.
258. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. para. 5 (1983) (amended 1994).
259. See supra note 169 (providing the text of Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6(b)).
260. Motion to Dismiss Complaint or to Stay Proceedings at 7, Devine v. Robinson, 131 F.
Supp. 2d 963 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (No. 00-CV-4974). In support of this view, the defendant cited an
explanatory memo submitted by the Committee on Professional Responsibility with the
amendments to the rules. The defendant then urged that the Illinois Supreme Court interpret the
rule following this "intent." Id.; see also Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 9, Devine v. Robinson, 131 F. Supp. 2d 963 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
(No. 00-CV-4974).
261. Devine, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 970.
2002]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
the rule. Simply stated, this is not what the rule says. 262 Therefore,
there is no guarantee that the disciplinary board or the courts will
interpret the rule this way every time. Since the Illinois rules do not
have comments to provide guidelines in determining when to file for a
violation of the rule, there is nothing written stating that this
interpretation is the official policy of the state.
If this is the real meaning of the rule, then section (b) is merely an
advisory provision that merely suggests what could be a problem. This
brings up the more general question of whether this is something that
belongs in the text of the rule itself. The ABA eliminated the equivalent
section from Model Rule 3.6 precisely because it thought it was better
to place such guidance in the comment to the rules rather than in the
rule itself. In its report explaining the 1994 amendments to the rules,
the ABA drafters stated:
[T]he Committee believes that the black letter text of the Rule should
be reserved for clear standards, deviation from which may result in
discipline.... This list of statements [in Rule 3.6(b)] likely to be
prejudicial is more appropriately located in the commentary to the
Rule, where it will serve as guidance to practitioners in deciding
whether to speak or what to say. The changes we propose, requiring
the application of reasoned judgment to specific facts in each
circumstance, will more likely result in an appropriate balance
between First Amendment rights and the need for fairness in
adjudicative proceedings. 263
In contrast, the drafters of the Illinois rule did not state in the
"explanatory notes" that were issued with the proposed amendments
why it would be a good idea to keep the list as part of the rules. The
obvious reason is a practical one: the Illinois rules do not have
comments. Thus, unless the rules are changed to include comments, the
question really is whether to keep the section in the rule or to drop it
altogether. Evidently, the Illinois Supreme Court thought that keeping
the section is the better alternative. However, in doing this, the rule
keeps the possible contradictions with the safe harbor and is open to
criticism and constitutional attacks. The court ought to reconsider this
decision in light of the constitutional analysis related to the vagueness
of the Nevada Rule provided by the Supreme Court in Gentile.
The second reason that the ABA decided to move the list of types of
impermissible statements to the comments was to eliminate the
262. The rule states it is a list of "subjects that would pose a serious and imminent threat" to a
proceeding. ILL. SuP. CT. R.P.C. 3.6(b) (2000).
263. ABA REPORT EXPLAINING 1994 AMENDMENTS, quoted in Hellman, supra note 39, at
34.
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vagueness in the rule criticized by the Court in Gentile.264 Writing for
the Court on that issue, Justice Kennedy invalidated the old rule because
of the vagueness that resulted from having a list of probably
impermissible statements and a safe harbor within the same rule.26
5
Kennedy found that the combination of these two sections created
confusion for lawyers trying to determine what conduct could violate
the rule. Arguably, a statement permitted under the safe harbor
provision could be banned under the section of impermissible
statements. 266 For example, a lawyer alleging that a prosecution witness
would lie to negotiate a plea bargain for himself or herself can argue
that the statement is permitted because it is a statement about the
general nature of the defense, while the state could argue that it is
impermissible because it is expressing an opinion of a witness'
credibility. Also, section (b)(1) says an attorney may not refer to a
party's criminal record,267 while section (b)(2) says an attorney may
refer to any matter "contained in the public record, 268 which would
include the defendant's criminal record.
On the other hand, it can be argued that the Illinois rule is different
than the one at issue in Gentile because section (b) is categorical and the
safe harbor and reply provisions do not say they operate as exceptions
to what is stated in section (b). Both section (c) and section (d) of the
rule begin with the phrase "[n]otwithstanding paragraph (a)."'269  Both
then proceed to state the types of statements that an attorney can make
without violating the rule.270 Since neither states that these statements
can be made notwithstanding paragraph (b), it could be argued that a
statement that could be classified under sections (c) or (d) would violate
the rule if it could also be classified under section (b). Under this
interpretation, an attorney would first have to look at section (b) and
264. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1048 (1991) (plurality opinion); see also
supra Part III.B (discussing the Court's analysis in Gentile).
265. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1048 (plurality opinion).
266. Justice Kennedy concluded: "Given [the rule's] grammatical structure, and absent any
clarifying interpretation by the state court, the Rule fails to provide 'fair notice to those to whom
[it] is directed."' Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112
(1972)). Likewise, analyzing the ABA Model Rules 1994 amendments, Professors Hazard and
Hodes have argued that it is possible for a statement which would otherwise have been proscribed
under section (a) will be permissible under section (b). They concluded this is the product of
"unfortunate" draftsmanship. I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 93, at 675, cited in Hellman,
supra note 39, at 36.
267. MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(b), (c) (1983) (amended 1994).
268. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(b)(2) (1983) (amended 1994).
269. ILL. SuP. CT. R.P.C. 3.6(c), (d) (2000).
270. Id.
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determine whether the statement would classify as one of the prohibited
types of statements. If so, the statement would be a violation of the rule
even if the attorney could argue that it was covered by the safe harbor
provision.
If interpreted this way, which was not suggested by the defendant in
Devine, the rule creates less confusion than the one in Gentile. Yet, it is
still not clear whether the fact that a statement could be interpreted to
classify under both the list of impermissible statements and the safe
harbor at the same time makes the rule constitutionally infirm. If, on
the other hand, the drafters were to eliminate the section on
impermissible statements, an attorney could look at the safe harbor and
determine which types of statements are acceptable before acting
accordingly. 27
1
Thus, a rule with both a section on impermissible statements and a
safe harbor can create confusion. The ABA concluded that these two
provisions could not stand together and moved the prohibitions to the
comment where they are intended only to provide guidance. 27 2  If the
Illinois drafters are not willing to do this, at the very least, they need to
include clearer language indicating the relationship between the
different sections of the rule.
A second problem with Illinois Rule 3.6(b) is that, because it is an
attempt to make a list of types of statements that are conclusively
prejudicial at any time, it does not allow an analysis based on the timing
of the statement. 273 This result could also make the rule overbroad
because it punishes speech which is harmful as well as speech which is
harmless. Commenting on the chilling effect these enumerative lists
have, one author has suggested that courts may be overly reliant on the
list instead of the underlying determination of the effect of the speech:
271. Gregg, supra note 4, at 1380 (commenting on California Rule 5-120, the author suggests
that if the list of impermissible statements is moved to the comments, the debate will center less
on whether the statement fits into a presumptively prejudicial category and more on whether it is
permitted under the delineated exceptions).
272. ABA REPORT EXPLAINING 1994 AMENDMENTS, cited in Hellman, supra note 39, at 34.
273. In his opinion in Gentile, Justice Kennedy stated that the application of a constitutional
standard to determine if a statement could lead to sanctions "requires an assessment of proximity
and degree of harm." Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1037 (1991) (plurality
opinion). He made a distinction between statements made on the eve of voir dire, which might
cause difficulties in securing a jury, and statements made six months prior to trial, which, like the
ones involved in Gentile, had no effect on the proceedings, their "content fading from memory
long before the trial date." Id. at 1044 (plurality opinion). For the argument by the prosecutors
on this issue in the Devine litigation, see Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief app. D,
at 9, Devine v. Robinson, 131 F. Supp. 2d 963 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (No. 00-CV-4974) (Suggestions in
Support of Petition for Reconsideration and Stay of Effect and Enforcement of Amended Rules of
Professional Conduct 3.6 & 3.8).
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Categorical lists of presumptively prejudicial statements may chill
lawyers from making statements forbidden under their provisions,
even when those statements might be justified under the
circumstances. Furthermore, courts and disciplinary boards may be
overly influenced by the categorical clarity of the list, and invoke it to
automatically punish apparently violative statements without
determining whether the statements actually had a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. 274
If the interpretation of Illinois Rule 3.6(b) in the end requires a case
by case determination of what statements are impermissible, it is
essential that courts consider the timing of the statement to determine its
prejudicial effect. In Gentile, Justice Kennedy made this point clear
when he wrote:
A statement which reaches the attention of the venire on the eve of
voir dire might require a continuance or cause difficulties in securing
an impartial jury, and at the very least could complicate the jury
selection process. As [it] turned out in the case here, exposure to the
same statement six months prior to trial would not result in prejudice,
the content fading from memory long before the trial date.
.... Given the size of the community from which any potential jury
venire would be drawn and the length of time before trial, only the
most damaging of information could give rise to any likelihood of
prejudice. 275
The rule in Illinois does not make a distinction on the effect of the
statement based on its timing as the ABA Model Code did. However,
the timing question is part of the analysis needed to determine if the
attorney "should have known" that the statement could have a
prejudicial effect on the proceeding. Obviously, the closer to the time
of a trial, the more likely it is that an attorney would know that the
questionable statement might have an effect on the proceeding. The
problem is that, as discussed above, there are doubts that an attorney
can ever "know." If the object of the rule is to create a categorical list
of statements or circumstances during which statements are
impermissible, it would be better to create a clear distinction taking into
account the timing of the speech. Although the rule is not
unconstitutional for this reason, it is certainly less precise than it could
be. 2
76
274. Gregg, supra note 4, at 1380.
275. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1044 (plurality opinion).
276. The prosecutors who asked the Illinois Supreme Court to reconsider the adoption of the
amendments suggested that the rule be clarified to apply to only a specific time. They suggested
that the rule apply only "when the case is in trial posture" by which they meant when a trial date
has been set, subpoenas have been issued, exhibits are prepared, etc. Complaint for Declaratory
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2. Should the Rule Contain a Safe Harbor Provision?
Illinois Rule 3.6(c) recognizes certain types of information that
attorneys can provide notwithstanding the general limits on extrajudicial
speech expressed in section (a) of the rule.277 However, section (c) is
not a complete safe harbor because it does not say these statements can
be issued notwithstanding section (b) which, as discussed above,
contains the list of types of statements that would violate the rule.278 In
other words, section (c) recognizes statements that can be issued as long
as they are not included in section (b). In contrast, former Rule 3.6(c)
was a safe harbor against both (a) and (b).279 While writing the new
rule, the drafters in Illinois specifically deleted the qualification of
paragraph (b), striking "and Rule 3.6(b)" from 3.6(c).28°
In Devine, the defendant was forced to concede that the language of
section (c) is reasonable and clear if "it is understood that paragraph (b)
is not intended to, and does not, establish a set of absolute prohibitions
that might otherwise appear to conflict with paragraph (c)." 28' The
problem is that section (b) can only be read to create an absolute
prohibition. Thus, it is fair to conclude that the amendment reduces the
scope of the safe harbor. If this was not the intended result of the
drafting process, it should be corrected. If it was, it results in the debate
discussed above on the possible conflicts between section (c) and
section (b).282
Furthermore, Illinois Rule 3.6(c) includes a common category of
information that has been severely criticized. The purpose of the safe
harbor provision is to give an attorney some guidance as to what types
of statements the attorney can make without violating the rule. For
instance, section (c)(2) states that an attorney may provide "information
and Injunctive Relief app. D, at 11, Devine v. Robinson, 131 F. Supp. 2d 963 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
(No. 00-CV-4974) (Suggestions in Support of Petition for Reconsideration and Stay of Effect and
Enforcement of Amended Rules of Professional Conduct 3.6 & 3.8). Perhaps the emphasis on
prejudicial pretrial publicity has been misplaced. Thus, the District of Columbia rule is limited to
cases currently in trial, when curing the prejudice can be far more difficult. ZITRIN &
LANGFORD, supra note 245, at 399.
277. ILL. SUP. CT. R.P.C. 3.6(a), (c).
278. See supra Part II.C (discussing amendments to the rules).
279. The old rule began with the phrase "[n]otwithstanding Rules 3.6(a) and 3.6(b) ......
Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss app. B, at 10,
Devine v. Robinson, 131 F. Supp. 2d 963 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (No. 00-CV-4974).
280. ILL. SUP. CT. R.P.C. 3.6(b), (c).
281. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Complaint or to Stay Proceedings at 7, Devine v.
Robinson, 131 F. Supp. 2d 963 (N.D. I11. 2001) (No. 00-CV-4974).
282. See supra notes 276-81 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 3.6(b), (c)).
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contained in a public record. '283 Aside from being in conflict with
section 3.6(b)(1), as discussed above, this provision creates a loophole
which could defeat the purpose of the rule in the first place. Prosecutors
who wish to provide information to the media can simply include as
much information as they want in the indictment. The prosecution may
tell a story by describing the alleged crime, the parties involved, what
unindicted conspirators might have said or done, and so forth.284 As
explained by Professor Monroe Freedman:
The biggest loophole that the rules provide for the prosecutor is the
permission to state information that is contained in the public record.
To take advantage of that rule, prosecutors who want to conduct press
conferences have developed the art of the "speaking indictment"-that
is, an indictment that effectively places "in the public record" (the
indictment) everything that the prosecutor would want to say in
pretrial publicity in glorification of the case and in condemnation of
the defendant. 285
Likewise, "defense counsel may file pleadings and other papers with the
court that tell the story from the defendant's perspective. '" 286  These
allegations and explanations become part of the public record that an
attorney may reveal without violating the rules intended to limit
extrajudicial statements. 287 To fix this "loophole" and to prevent abuses
related to the "speaking indictment" the language of the rule could be
changed to limit the use of the public record further.288
3. Should the Rule Define the Type of Proceedings to Which it
Applies?
The comment to ABA Model Rule 3.6 explains that the nature of the
proceeding involved in a case is an important factor to consider in
283. ILL. SUP. CT. R.P.C. 3.6(c)(2).
284. See Robert Hardaway & Douglas Tumminello, Pretrial Publicity in Criminal Cases of
National Notoriety: Constructing a Remedy for the Remediless Wrong, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 39, 80
(1996).
285. FREEDMAN, supra note 180, at 233; see also Gregg, supra note 4, at 1379; 1 HAZARD &
HODES, supra note 93, at 675, cited in Hellman, supra note 39, at 36.
286. Hardaway & Tumminello, supra note 284, at 80.
287. Professors Hodes and Hazard have argued that the safe harbor in the ABA Model Rules
allows the disclosure of too much information. They object to the fact that Model Rule 3.6(b)(1)
would allow a defendant's attorney to leak information about a possible insanity defense, that
section (b)(2) would allow a prosecutor to read details from an indictment at a news conference,
and that section (b)(7) would allow disclosure of personal information which may be a needless
invasion of privacy. I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 93, at 675, cited in Hellman, supra note 39,
at 36.
288. For example, the comment to the rule in the District of Columbia uses the phrase
"technicalities of the indictment." FREEDMAN, supra note 180, at 235.
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determining if there is a violation to the rule.289 The Illinois rules do
not have a similar provision. The only mention of a distinction in the
effect of a statement appears as part of Rule 3.6(b), but, as discussed
above, that section is a categorical rule so the distinction in reality does
not make a difference. 290 However, the nature of the proceeding might
be an important factor in determining whether an attorney "should have
known" that a statement would pose a threat to the proceeding. Thus, it
is important for the courts to interpret the application of the rule along
the lines of the ABA Model Rule's comment.
4. The Regulation of Prosecutors' Extrajudicial Statements
In response to Gentile, both the ABA and, more recently, the Illinois
Supreme Court amended Rule 3.8, which prescribes some specific
duties of prosecutors. 291 The amendments included the addition of a
clause to Rule 3.8 that forbids prosecutors from making unnecessary
prejudicial statements. 292  Perhaps based on the notion that most
extrajudicial comments in criminal cases come from prosecutors, Model
Rule 3.8 attempts to restrain prosecutors from making comments that
will increase the possibility of defense lawyers trying to reply for their
clients in the media.293 In the comment to Model Rule 3.8, the drafters
indicate that the purpose of the rule is to protect the accused from
"public condemnation." 294  The comment concludes that "[n]othing in
289. The comment to Model Rule 3.6 states:
Another relevant factor in determining prejudice is the nature of the proceeding
involved. Criminal jury trials will be most sensitive to extrajudicial speech. Civil
trials may be less sensitive. Non-jury hearings and arbitration proceedings may be
even less affected. The Rule will still place limitations on prejudicial comments in
these cases, but the likelihood of prejudice may be different depending on the type of
proceeding.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. para. 6 (1983) (amended 1994).
290. The first paragraph of section (b) reads: "There are certain subjects which would pose a
serious and imminent threat to the fairness of a proceeding, particularly when they refer to a civil
matter triable to a jury, or a criminal matter... " ILL. SuP. CT. R.P.C. 3.6(b).
291. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e), (g) (1983) (amended 1994); ILL. SUP. CT.
R.P.C. 3.8(c), (d) (2000).
292. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(g) (1983) (amended 1994); ILL. SUP. CT.
R.P.C. 3.8(d) (2000).
293. Gregg, supra note 4, at 1385 ("One of the major complaints of defense lawyers is that
their clients are being tried in the media, often fueled by prosecutors' statements and leaks. With
this Rule, the ABA hopes to reduce the incidence of trial by the press .....
294. The comment reads:
Paragraph (g) supplements Rule 3.6, which prohibits extrajudicial statements that have
a substantial likelihood of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. In the context of a
criminal prosecution, a prosecutor's extrajudicial statement can create the additional
problem of increasing public condemnation of the accused. Although the
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this Comment is intended to restrict the statement which a prosecutor
may make which comply with Rule 3.6(b) or 3.6(c). 295 This provision
is particularly important because it explains the relationship between the
special responsibilities of prosecutors and the general rule on
extrajudicial speech that applies to all attorneys. This explanation is
missing in the Illinois rules. From the text of the Illinois rules it is not
at all clear how prosecutors should interpret their duties. On the one
hand, Rule 3.8(d) says they should refrain from making comments that
would "pose a serious and imminent threat of heightening public
condemnation of the accused, ' 296 while on the other Rule 3.6(c) would
allow them to read the indictment, state the offense involved, reveal the
identity, residence, occupation and other personal information of the
accused.297 To some degree, all of these statements do pose a danger of
heightening public condemnation of the accused. If the Illinois rules are
interpreted as suggested by the ABA comment, however, the prosecutor
would not violate the rules with this disclosure. If, however, Rule
3.8(d) is interpreted on its own, as written, the prosecutor could be in
violation of the rule. The result is confusion on the part of the
prosecutor as to what conduct would violate the rules, which opens the
rule to vagueness attacks as discussed by Justice Kennedy in his
majority opinion in Gentile.
A second method to regulate prosecutors' extrajudicial speech in both
the Model Rules and the Illinois rules is the recognition of a duty to
exercise due care to see that other people involved in the preparation of
the case do not make statements for which the prosecutors themselves
could be disciplined.298 In Devine, the prosecutors argued that the rule
was unconstitutional because it requires state agents to suppress the
speech of others by threatening the prosecutors with punishment and
announcement of an indictment, for example, will necessarily have severe
consequences for the accused, a prosecutor can, and should, avoid comments which
have no legitimate law enforcement purpose and have a substantial likelihood of
increasing public opprobrium of the accused. Nothing in this Comment is intended to
restrict the statements which a prosecutor may make which comply with Rule 3.6(b) or
3.6(c).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. para. 5 (1983) (amended 1994).
295. Id.
296. ILL. SUP. CT. R.P.C. 3.8(d).
297. ILL. SUP. CT. R.P.C. 3.6(c).
298. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e) (1983) (amended 1994); ILL. SUP. CT.
R.P.C. 3.8(d).
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that the rule was essentially unenforceable because the prosecutors did
not have any control over those "other people."
299
Again, the rule seems to be based on the notion that most of the
information in criminal cases is provided by the prosecutorial "teams,"
including members of the prosecutors' office, the police department,
investigators and so on. The rule takes notice of the practice of
assembling these teams to work on cases 300 and attempts to prevent the
attorneys in the team from using non-lawyers as mouthpieces and, thus,
avoid compliance with the regulation. Arguably the duty of the
prosecutors in this respect is not that different than the duty recognized
on all lawyers to supervise the work of non-lawyer assistants, such as
Model Rule 5.3 and Illinois Rule 5.3.31
However, there is a significant difference between the duties
described by those rules and the duties imposed on the prosecutors by
Rule 3.8. The rules that refer to an attorney's supervisory
responsibilities are limited to circumstances in which the attorney
actually has direct supervisory authority. While both Rule 5.3 and Rule
3.8 are based on a duty to take reasonable measures to make sure that
the non-lawyer assistant's conduct is compatible with lawyer's ethical
standards, Rule 3.8 extends that duty to people over whom there is no
supervisory relationship. Thus, the application of the standard created
by this rule, and its effectiveness as a method to limit speech, will
necessarily be subject to a case-specific determination as to the
prosecutor's relationship with the speaker. A recently approved
amendment to the comment to Model Rule 3.8(e) added a new
paragraph that states:
Like other lawyers, prosecutors are subject to Rules 5.1 and 5.3, which
relate to responsibilities regarding lawyers and nonlawyers who work
for or are associated with the lawyer's office. Paragraph (f) [currently
section (e)] reminds the prosecutor of the importance of these
obligations in connection with the unique dangers of improper
extrajudicial statements in a criminal case. In addition, paragraph (f)
299. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 6, 8, Devine v. Robinson, 131 F.
Supp. 2d 963 (N.D. I11. 2001) (No. 00-CV-4974).
300. United States v Boyd, 833 F. Supp. 1277, 1353 (N.D. I11. 1993), aff'd, 55 F.3d 239 (7th
Cir. 1995). The court in Boyd discussed who is a member of a "prosecution team" for purposes
of a violation of the duty to disclose information to defense counsel and found that "[i]t is well
settled that information possessed by any member of the United States Attorneys' Office will be
attributed ... to the 'prosecution.' ... Likewise, it is also clear that the 'prosecution' includes
police officers, federal agents and other investigatory personnel ..... Id.
301. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (1983) (amended 1994); ILL. SUP. CT. R.P.C.
5.3; see also supra note 299 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutionality of
preventing lawyers from assisting nonlawyers in making statements).
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requires a prosecutor to exercise reasonable care to prevent persons
assisting or associated with the prosecutor from making improper
extrajudicial statements, even when such persons are not under the
direct supervision of the prosecutor. Ordinarily, the reasonable care
standard will be satisfied if the prosecutor issues the appropriate
cautions to law-enforcement personnel and other relevant
individuals. 30
2
In conclusion, it is important to define and limit the "other people"
the prosecutor has to worry about under Illinois Rule 3.8. The rule must
be limited to those who work with the prosecution team and upon whom
the prosecutor has some sort of supervisory relationship. A broader
scope might impose a duty on the prosecutor, which cannot be met and
which might result in unfairness to prosecutors or in chilled speech.
Also, because the standard used to evaluate the prosecutor's conduct is
that of reasonable care, disciplinary boards and courts must make a case
by case determination based on many factors and following the new
ABA comment's approach that essentially warns not to impose more of
a duty on the prosecutor than is warranted under the circumstances.
Thus, for the rule to be fairly applied, the conduct must be judged
according to the reasonableness of the efforts under the circumstances,
taking into account the relationship between the prosecutor and the
other people involved and the context in which the statements are made.
The conduct should not be evaluated based on the sole fact that a
statement was made and certainly not based on the content of the
statement.
On the other hand, if all a prosecutor is required to do to meet the
standard of care is to issue some cautions to law enforcement personnel,
the effect of the rule as a limit on prejudicial speech will be extremely
limited. Perhaps it would be a good idea to consider re-drafting the
duty of the prosecutor and actually copying the language in Rule 5.3
which is more specific in how it makes a lawyer responsible for a non-
lawyer's conduct.
V. CONCLUSION
As the comment to Model Rule 3.6 states, it is difficult to achieve a
balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the
right to free expression. 30 3 After Gentile, commentators argued that the
302. ABA Comm. on Evaluations of the Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Report with
Recommendation to the House of Delegates, Rule 3.8 draft (2001) (explaining proposed changes
to Rule 3.8), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rule38.html.
303. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. para. 1 (1983) (amended 1994).
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application of the rules on extrajudicial speech would be uneven since
prosecutors had more access to the media, the rules were enforced less
against them and they would be entirely free from blame when their
agents did the talking. 30 4 The recent amendments to Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct 3.6 and 3.8 are an attempt to regulate this balance.
However, instead of expanding the freedom of expression for criminal
defense attorneys, the new rules seek to limit the prosecutors to the
same level.
While the rules may be effective in reminding lawyers of their ethical
obligation to avoid prejudicing adjudications, it remains to be seen how
balanced they will turn out to be. Some argue that the end result is that
lawyers lose free speech rights, criminal defendants lose an advocate
and the public loses a source of important information concerning the
judicial system. Others, however, argue that the rules present the best
alternative to the growing problems created by high profile cases.
This Article has argued that the issues raised by the attempt to
regulate conduct in this area raises doubts about whether the state
should even attempt to regulate it at all. For example, it has been
argued that extensive regulation of trial publicity is constitutionally
suspect because it discourages speech whose harm cannot be
demonstrated and often can be characterized as political speech.
On the other hand protecting the right to a fair trial is a goal
important enough to justify some regulation within the limits of the
Constitution. If the state must regulate attorneys' speech, the adoption
of a clear and present danger test as the baseline for determining the
propriety of an attorney's disclosure of information, as the Illinois Rules
have done, is certainly the best approach. At least one commentator has
concluded that in the end, under the serious and imminent standard, it
will be a rare case in which comments by a lawyer will be chilled,
particularly in view of the cases in which juries have been found to have
been impartial despite pervasive publicity.30 5
A closer look at the rules themselves, nevertheless, suggests the need
for further debate as to their application and interpretation. This Article
has suggested some ideas that need to be developed in that debate and
has offered some suggestions on how to interpret the rules and how to
correct drafting problems.
304. See, e.g., Berkowitz-Caballero, supra note 85, at 532-34.
305. FREEDMAN, supra note 180, at 235 (commenting on the rule applicable in the District of
Columbia).
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